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FOREWORD
In December 2011, the last U.S. combat troops were
withdrawn from Iraq after an almost 9-year presence
in that country. This day was welcomed by the U.S.
public after years of sacrifice and struggle to build a
new Iraq. Yet, the Iraq that U.S. troops have left at the
insistence of its government remains a deeply troubled nation. Often Iraqi leaders view political issues
in sharply sectarian terms, and national unity is elusive. The Iraqi political system was organized by both
the United States and Iraq, although over time, U.S.
influence diminished and Iraqi influence increased. In
this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill examines the
policies of de-Ba’athification as initiated by the U.S.led Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and as practiced by various
Iraqi political commissions and entities created under
the CPA order. He also considers the ways in which
the Iraqi de-Ba’athification program has evolved and
remained an important but divisive institution over
time. Dr. Terrill suggests that many U.S. officials in
Iraq saw problems with de-Ba’athification, but they
had difficulties softening or correcting the process
once it had become firmly established in Iraqi hands.
Other U.S. policymakers were slower in recognizing
the politicized nature of de-Ba’athification and its devolution into a process in which both its Iraqi supporters and opponents viewed it as an instrument of Shi’ite
revenge and political domination of Sunni Arabs.
Dr. Terrill’s monograph considers both the future
of Iraq and the differences and similarities between
events in Iraq and the Arab Spring states. He has examined both Ba’athism as a concept and the ways in
which it was practiced in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. He
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notes that the initial principles of Ba’athism were sufficiently broad as to allow their acquisition by a tyrant
seeking ideological justification for a merciless regime. His comprehensive analysis of Iraqi Ba’athism
ensures that he does not overgeneralize when drawing potential parallels to events in the Arab Spring
countries. Dr. Terrill considers the nature of Iraqi
de-Ba’athification in considerable depth and carefully
evaluates the rationales and results of actions taken
by both Americans and Iraqis involved in the process.
While there are many differences between the formation of Iraq’s post-Saddam Hussein government
and the current efforts of some Arab Spring governing bodies to restructure their political institutions,
it is possible to identify parallels between Iraq and
Arab Spring countries. Some insights for emerging
governments may, correspondingly, be guided by a
comprehensive understanding of these parallels. The
Arab Spring revolutions that have overthrown the
governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen at
the time of this writing are a regional process of stunning importance. While these revolutions began with
a tremendous degree of hope, great difficulties loom
in the future. New governments will have to apportion power, build or reform key institutions, establish
political legitimacy for those institutions, and accommodate the enhanced expectations of their publics in a
post-revolutionary environment. A great deal can go
wrong in these circumstances, and it is important to
consider ways in which these new governing structures can be supported, so long as they remain inclusive and democratic. Any lessons that can be gleaned
from earlier conflicts will be of considerable value to
the nations facing these problems as well as to their regional and extra-regional allies seeking to help them.

iv

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation
continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East and the
ongoing challenge of advancing U.S. interests in a
time of Middle East turbulence. This analysis should
be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to regional security issues, the future of Iraq, and the support of local
allies and emerging governments. This work may also
benefit those seeking a greater understanding of longrange issues of Middle Eastern and global security. It
is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers of
all services as well as other U.S. government officials
involved in military and security assistance planning.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The presence of U.S. combat troops in Iraq has now
come to an end, and the lessons of that conflict for the
United States and other nations will be debated for
some time to come. It is now widely understood that
the post-invasion policy of de-Ba’athification, as practiced, had numerous unintended consequences that
made building Iraqi civil society especially difficult
following the U.S.-led invasion. The U.S. approach
to this policy is often assessed as having underestimated both the dangers of increased sectarianism in
Iraq and the need for strong efforts to manage ethnicsectarian divisions. The Iraqi government’s approach
to de-Ba’athification was, nevertheless, much more
problematic due to its openly biased and sectarian
nature. However well-intentioned, de-Ba’athification
originally was as a concept, in practice it had a number of serious problems. These problems intensified
and became more alarming as the de-Ba’athification
process became increasingly dominated by the Iraqis
and American oversight over that program gradually
evaporated. At that time, it came to be viewed as an
instrument of revenge and collective punishment by
both the Iraqis that administered de-Ba’athification
and those that were targeted by these policies.
A comprehensive review of Iraqi de-Ba’athification
is necessary before making any assertions about the
lessons of these policies for either Iraq or the larger
Arab World. Understanding de-Ba’athification begins
with a consideration of U.S. policies and goals for Iraq.
After the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, the
U.S. leadership had a choice of implementing limited
de-Ba’athification or seeking a much more sweeping
program. They initially chose the latter course because
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it was deemed especially important to eliminate the
last vestiges of Saddam Hussein’s regime to prevent
a similar type of government from reestablishing
itself. In making this choice, advocates of deep deBa’athification pointed to the history of Ba’athist conspirators rising to power through infiltrating government institutions and seizing power in undemocratic
ways. This comprehensive approach nevertheless
made it extremely difficult for Iraq’s Sunni Arab leaders to accept the post-war political system. Many U.S.
leaders became concerned about this problem over
time, but they had increasing difficulties moderating
Iraqi administration of de-Ba’athification efforts.
Despite the time that has elapsed since the initial
decisions on de-Ba’athification, these issues remain
vital for the future of Iraq. The Sunni Arab insurgency
that developed after the U.S.-led invasion reinforced
the popularity of de-Ba’athification among many of
Iraq’s Shi’ite Arabs, thereby keeping the policy alive.
Many Shi’ites also agreed with U.S. concerns about
the potential emergence of a new Sunni-dominated
regime that would once again seize and retain power.
A quasi-legal de-Ba’athification Commission (now
known as the Justice and Accountability Commission) continues to exist in Iraq and recently played
a dramatic role in disqualifying some leading Sunni
candidates in the 2010 parliamentary elections. This
commission could not have remained relevant without the support of a variety of important Iraqi politicians, including the current prime minister. Likewise,
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki arrested large numbers of
so-called “Ba’athists” in 2011, shortly before the final
withdrawal of U.S. troops. Under these circumstances,
the legacy of de-Ba’athification and the future of this
concept within the Iraqi political system may yet have
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serious consequences for Iraq’s ability to build a unified and successful state.
Many Americans and Iraqis of diverse political orientations have argued that de-Ba’athification and the
nature of sectarianism in Iraq involved a large number
of lessons that other countries may wish to consider in
the context of future political transitions. This argument has found considerable resonance among some
citizens in the “Arab Spring” states where popular
uprisings have ousted some long-serving dictators.
Many of the new revolutionaries consider Iraq’s problems as a cautionary tale that must be understood as
they move forward in establishing new political systems. In particular, it is now understood that loyalty
commissions led by politicians and set up to identify
internal enemies can take on a life of their own and
become part of a nation’s power structure. Once this
occurs, such organizations are exceedingly difficult to
disestablish. Likewise, the basic unfairness of collective punishment has again been underscored as an engine of anger, resentment, and backlash. Conversely,
the importance of honest and objective judicial institutions has also been underscored, as has the importance
of maintaining a distinction between revenge and justice. Moreover, officers and senior non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) of the U.S. Army must realize that
they may often have unique opportunities and unique
credibility to offer advice on the lessons of Iraq to
their counterparts in some of the Arab Spring nations.
The U.S. Army has a long history of cooperating with
some of the Arab Spring militaries and has a particularly strong relationship with the Egyptian military.
These bonds of trust, cooperation, and teamwork can
be used to convey a variety of messages beyond exclusively military issues.
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All of the Arab Spring states may usefully consider the potential insights offered by events in Iraq,
but the two Arab countries where the lessons of deBa’athification may be most relevant are Libya and
Syria. Libya is currently organizing a post-Qadhafi
government, while Syria is undergoing a process of
revolution that seems increasingly difficult for the authorities to extinguish. In Libya, post-Qadhafi leaders
are openly concerned about avoiding what they identify as the mistakes of Iraq. It remains to be seen if they
are able to do so, or if they fall into new systems of
internal warfare and perhaps new dictatorship. Syria
maintains both a society and a style of rule that has
notable similarities to the Saddam Hussein government. Its future is deeply problematic, as revolutionaries struggle against an entrenched, well-armed, and
increasingly desperate dictatorial regime that is also
deeply sectarian in nature.

xii

LESSONS OF THE IRAQI DE-BA’ATHIFICATION
PROGRAM FOR IRAQ’S FUTURE
AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS
There was a tendency among promoters of the [20032011 Iraq] war to believe that democracy was a default
condition to which societies would revert once liberated from dictators.
		

Francis Fukuyama1

I pleaded with Bremer not to dissolve the [Iraqi] army,
and warned him that it would blow up in our faces.
I told him that I understood the rationale behind the
process of de-Baathification, but that it needed to apply
only to those at the top with blood on their hands….I
said I hoped he understood that if he was going to deBaathify across the board, he would be setting himself up for major resistance and would create a power
vacuum that someone would have to fill.
			

King Abdullah II of Jordan2

You cannot build a country if you don’t have reconciliation and forgiveness.
			
			
			

Aref Ali Nayed
Libyan National
Transitional Council3

INTRODUCTION
The presence of U.S. combat troops in Iraq has now
come to an end, and the lessons of that conflict, including those involving de-Ba’athification, will be debated
for some time to come. De-Ba’athification for Iraq was
initiated by U.S. policymakers in 2003 as the process
of eliminating the ideology of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party
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from public life and removing its more influential adherents from the Iraqi political and administrative system. This policy constituted a central part of the effort
to eliminate all significant aspects of the Saddamist
state and remake Iraq into a democratic nation. It has
also emerged as one of the most controversial aspects
of U.S. post-war activities in Iraq. While supporters
claim that the approach was unavoidable if Iraq was
to be reformed, critics maintain that the approach, as
practiced, amplified sectarian divisions in Iraq and
also served as an important enabler of enhanced sectarianism and the post-invasion Iraqi insurgency.
U.S. Government decisionmaking about the nature
and depth of the de-Ba’athification effort centered on
the conflict between pragmatists who were attempting to prevent U.S. and Iraqi post-war authorities from
losing their capacity to manage the emerging crisis in
Iraq and various hardliners—often called neoconservatives—calling for a fundamental restructuring of
Iraqi society. The dominant fear of the first group was
that Iraq would degenerate into chaos without some
effort to rehabilitate and retain those Ba’athist bureaucrats and officials not directly implicated in the Saddam Hussein regime’s crimes. For the second group,
the primary concern appeared to be ensuring that a
favorable outcome for regime change was permanent.
Their greatest fear was often that a system of “Saddamism without Saddam” would dominate the postwar environment unless large-scale societal restructuring took place within Iraq.4 In both groups, there
was a wide range of opinion, and some individuals
(perhaps most prominently National Security Council
[NSC] Advisor and later Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) were open to the arguments of both sides and
sought to synthesize them into coherent policy.
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While de-Ba’athification still retains some defenders in the United States, most Middle Eastern politicians and observers consider it to have been deeply
misguided, and many Arabs view it as a warning of
the ways in which a transition from dictatorial rule
can go wrong and lurch dangerously close to civil
war. A strong exception to this belief can sometimes
be found among Iraqi and other Arab Shi’ites, who basically approve of a policy that punishes Iraq’s Sunni
Arab community from which Saddam drew most of
his supporters and that suffered less than other Iraqi
communities under the dictatorship. The future of
Iraq as a cohesive and modernizing country remains
uncertain, and it is unclear if that society can overcome simmering sectarian differences, which current
approaches to de-Ba’athification continue to inflame.
The ways in which Iraq deals with the legacy of deBa’athification, as well as ongoing policies for national
reconciliation, will have a great deal to do with deciding the Iraq future. While Iraqis often dream of building a society as prosperous as the Arab Gulf states, the
danger remains of an Iraqi society that looks more like
Lebanon during its 14-year sectarian civil war.
The onset of the Arab Spring has revived a
number of questions about the problems with deBa’athification. At the time of this writing, Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya have experienced Arab Spring
popular uprisings in which long-standing dictators
have been ousted. Syria is also experiencing a serious
mass uprising led by brave and extremely committed
revolutionaries struggling against an entrenched and
ruthlessly tenacious dictatorship. None of these states
has ever experienced a government as authoritarian
as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, although the Syrian dictatorship clearly comes the closest to the Saddamist
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model. All of these states face considerable difficulties in establishing legitimate and moderate post-revolutionary governments, and some face the danger of
prolonged civil conflict. Lessons that can be gleaned
from the Iraqi experience may therefore be especially
important for their future.
THE BA’ATH PARTY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
SADDAM HUSSEIN’S DOMINATION OF IRAQ
In order to understand problems surrounding the
effort to remove Ba’athism from Iraq, it is necessary
to give some consideration to the central tenets of
Ba’athism as a political ideology and then to examine
the ways in which this ideology was applied and practiced within Iraq under Saddam Hussein. In undertaking this analysis, it is worthwhile to consider that a
number of dictatorial regimes have used official ideologies to justify the power of a particular elite rather
than to guide their actions. Some individuals within
the ruling elite of such systems may view themselves
as seeking to adjust their approaches to emerging
problems by emphasizing those aspects of the ideology that seem most useful for addressing a given problem, while de-emphasizing those that are less useful.
Such people remain ideologues despite their willingness to show a limited degree of flexibility. Others do
not take the national ideology particularly seriously
but value its supporting party infrastructure to justify
and generate support for the decisions of the political
leadership, regardless of how ideologically inconsistent those decisions may be. These people are political
opportunists in ideological garb.
The Ba’ath movement was founded in the 1940s by
two Syrian teachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bi-
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tar, and stressed Arab unity, socialism, and efforts to
modernize the Arab World. The party, which emerged
in its modern form in 1947, sought to unite all Arab
states and to provide them with a set of modernizing principles to help them overcome problems with
poverty and backwardness. The word Ba’ath means
renaissance or rebirth in Arabic. The movement also
sought to address the problems of the entire Arab
World and was not to be confined to any individual
country. Ba’athists throughout the Arab World were
often viewed as committed Arab nationalists who
were particularly devoted to the concept of a strong,
unified Arab nation. Their slogan is, “One Arab nation
with an eternal mission.”
Aflaq and Bitar met at the Sorbonne in Paris,
France, in 1929 where both of them became especially
interested in Western literature and philosophy with
an emphasis on Marxism and socialism. This form of
study was a fairly conventional approach for Arab
students in France, since only the French communists
and socialists showed much sympathy for Syrian independence within the political spectrum of Paris in the
1930s. Moreover, Marxism’s emphasis on modernization and scientific socialism appealed to the two men
as they struggled for a solution to widespread Arab
impoverishment and underdevelopment. The Ba’ath
Party. Thus began as a secular organization seeking to
modernize the Arab World in ways that were rooted
in leftist, European political and social thought. Islam was not seen as a major part of this modernizing
outlook. In this regard, Aflaq was not even a Muslim,
having been raised as an Orthodox Christian.5 Batar
was a Sunni Muslim and, like Aflaq, had no interest
in religion as a basis for the state. Within the context
of Ba’athist ideology, Islam was primarily viewed as
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part of the Arab heritage rather than a way to organize
contemporary political life. Their outlook was correspondingly deeply secular.
Like Marxist-Leninist organizations, the Ba’ath
Party sought to enter power through the actions of
a revolutionary elite operating in a variety of states,
including Iraq. In the 1950s and 1960s, these tactics
caused the Ba’ath to compete with a number of other
conspiratorial movements to infiltrate the military
and other centers of state power. Subversion and
coups seemed the only way in which to achieve power since contested elections were almost never held
in any Arab country except perhaps Lebanon. Major
emerging political trends throughout the Arab World
included communist and Nasserite movements as
well as the Ba’ath. Thus, to achieve power within the
various Arab countries Ba’athists had to operate clandestinely as one of many secretive opposition movements dealing with government counterintelligence
units and their own splinter groups. Despite these difficulties, Ba’athists seized power in Syria and Iraq in
1963.6 The Iraqi Ba’ath Party remained in power for
less than a year but once again seized power in 1968
partially as a result of the maneuverings of a young
revolutionary named Saddam Hussein. Additionally,
the previous Iraqi government had been unable to
provide significant help to the other Arab countries
at war with Israel in June 1967. Iraqi Ba’athist leaders
portrayed this failure as a form of treason, and made
anti-Israeli invective a centerpiece of their rhetoric following their seizure of power.7
The Iraqi Ba’ath Party began its existence with a
commitment that all party members should have a
broad set of rights to elect officials and present their
views in party forums. Unfortunately, this approach
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changed rapidly over time, and by 1964 Aflaq was
complaining about the stratification of the party and
the consolidation of power by a limited number of
“active members” with influence that dramatically exceeded that of the rank and file. He stated that such an
approach “was wholly out of keeping with the spirit
of our party’s rules.”8 Nevertheless, the requirement
for the Ba’ath Party to carry out its activities in secret
until it seized power for the second time in 1968 remained a central part of Ba’ath organizational culture
throughout the organization’s existence. During its
underground years, the Ba’ath became increasingly
hierarchical, secretive, and accustomed to violence
as a political tool. These mindsets carried over to the
years in power when such an approach was viewed as
equally necessary to cope with real and imagined internal and foreign enemies. The Ba’ath leaders continued to see conspiracies against their government from
a variety of sources including the Western powers and
Israel. The failure of Iraq’s first Ba’ath government to
remain in power more than a year underscored the
looming danger of a countercoup.
Ba’athism appeared to have some problems establishing a popular base in the first years after the 1968
coup. Some Iraqi citizens appreciated Ba’ath ideology
for its emphasis on modernity and its rejection of ethnic/sectarian divisions, tribalism, and religion as the
basis for a modern state. Unfortunately, in both Iraq
and Syria, these principles had a more insidious function as well, helping to serve as a smokescreen for the
domination of one social group over the others in each
country. Secular principles in Syria were used to mask
the almost complete domination of Syrian society
by the Alawite minority, which is usually identified
as an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam. In Iraq, the Ba’athist
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regime was dominated by Sunni Muslims, especially
from the areas around Tikrit. The initial leader of the
1968 Ba’ath revolution in Iraq was General Ahmad
Hassan al-Bakr, but he was progressively eclipsed by
his young cousin, the hard-working, pragmatic, intelligent, and ruthless Saddam Hussein.
Saddam Hussein emerged as the strongman behind the scenes of the regime by the early 1970s and
replaced Bakr as president in July 1979. Although Saddam permitted some loyal Shi’ites to rise to high-profile positions in government and the military, the core
of his support was composed of Sunni Arabs. Shi’ite
political leadership was traditionally drawn from the
Iraqi Communist Party, the al-Dawa Islamiya (Islamic
Call) Party, and the Shi’ite clergy. Both the Iraqi Communist Party and the Dawa Party were outlawed by
the Ba’athists, and their members were ruthlessly
massacred during Saddam’s years in power. The
Shi’ite clergy also faced massive repression under the
Saddam Hussein regime, although the regime could
not actually wipe them out without severe internal
and regional repercussions. Instead, Saddam sought
to silence the clerical leaders or force them to speak
in favor of the regime. He also demanded that Sunni
clerics adopt a nonpolitical role but never saw them as
the same type of threat as the leading Shi’ite ayatollahs.
Saddam’s relationship with Ba’athism is complex.
His ability to emerge as a key Ba’athist leader is directly attributable to party co-founder, Michel Aflaq,
who befriended Saddam in exile after the younger
man was forced to flee Iraq following his participation in an unsuccessful assassination attempt against
Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qassim. During his years
outside Iraq, Saddam was able to gain Aflaq’s patron-

8

age as a way to achieve high rank within the party.
Saddam’s ongoing relationship with Aflaq was useful
to him throughout his life. Unlike the Syrian Ba’ath
Party, which ousted Aflaq and Bitar from power in
February 1966, Saddam remained aware of the value
of maintaining Aflaq as an honored but powerless
member of the Iraqi leadership. Aflaq, for his part,
had hoped to be a positive and moderating influence
on Saddam once the dictator achieved power, but
most of his suggestions on important issues were ignored. Saddam did flatter the older man by agreeing
to some of his minor concerns. Such cosmetic concessions were an acceptable trade-off for the public support of one of Ba’athism’s co-founders. By consorting
with the dictator, Aflaq allowed Saddam to exploit
him and Ba’athism as window dressing for one of the
world’s most oppressive regimes. Bitar, by contrast,
spent the remainder of his life in Europe. Aflaq died
in 1989 in Paris, and Saddam let it be known that he
used his personal funds to build a suitable tomb for
the co-founder of Ba’athism.
Saddam was not a military man, and as a youth
was rejected for entry into the Iraqi military academy
due to poor performance on his entrance examinations.9 Throughout his rise to power, Saddam was correspondingly wary of the danger of a military coup
and used the Ba’ath Party to help him secure full
control over the Army. This concern is easily understandable since coups were the traditional means of
ousting an Iraqi leader once his enemies were able to
organize against him. In establishing an iron grip over
the military, Saddam made heavy use of Ba’athist political officers and frequently promoted cronies within
the military over more qualified officers. Officers with
particularly heroic reputations in the Iran-Iraq war, as
well as brilliant planners, were quietly sidelined, since
9

there was room for only one “military genius” in Saddam’s Iraq. Saddam understood the value of efficient
officers during times of war, but tended to place these
officers in less important positions when he no longer
had an immediate need for them.
The Ba’ath Party was also useful to Saddam in
other ways than simply controlling the military and
providing an ideological veneer for the regime. The
creation of the Saddam personality cult had nothing
to do with original Ba’ath ideology, but it was administered and energized by Ba’ath Party activists. As
Saddam Hussein consolidated his rule over Iraq, he
consistently viewed the Ba’ath Party as an instrument
of dictatorial power and social mobilization. He did
not take its ideology and values seriously as principles
for leadership, and individuals at the highest levels
were noted for their public and ostentatiously blind
loyalty to the President rather than their knowledge
of Ba’athist principles and political thought. While
many members of the top leadership were Sunni, this
was not an absolute requirement. Proven Saddam
loyalists included Shi’ites, Kurds, and various sects
of Christians.10 If Saddam believed a subordinate was
a proven and committed loyalist, he did not particularly care what that person’s sect or ethnicity was. On
the other hand, Saddam often viewed his own family
and Sunni Arabs from the Tikrit area as having a head
start on loyalty.11 Saddam and his cronies also seemed
to view Sunni Arabs as being more likely to remain
loyal, because they were usually more hostile to the
traditional enemy of Iran and were likely to fear a new
Shi’ite government in which they could be viewed as
accomplices in Saddam’s crimes. Consequently, the
Sunni Arabs were disproportionately represented in
the Ba’ath’s senior ranks and the regime’s security
units.
10

Once in power, the Ba’ath Party did follow through
on some of its modernization rhetoric. Saddam was
committed to building a modern state, although he
basically sought this goal primarily to improve the efficiency of the dictatorship rather than to benefit the
Iraqi people. Consequently, serious and intense Ba’ath
Party literacy drives did more than teach Iraqi citizens
how to read.12 They also opened an intellectual pathway that allowed them to be more thoroughly bombarded with regime propaganda. Efforts to reduce the
power of the tribes and to limit the role of religion in
public life were similarly presented as modernization
efforts, although their primary purpose was to further
centralize power in Baghdad. Moreover, such policies
could be reversed when they were no longer convenient to the regime, as occurred in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s when Saddam’s regime sought
to encourage some increased religious devotion, so
long as such sentiments were properly channeled into
activities that the regime viewed as useful.13 Additionally, Saddam was also willing to work through tribal
elements when it suited his purposes.
On the eve of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Saddam’s
Iraq was a one of the most rigid totalitarian states in
the world, with a privileged elite composed of military leaders and Ba’ath Party members, virtually all of
whom were terrified of the leader.14 The Ba’ath Party
had at least two million members at that time, with
some estimates reaching 2.5 million. Nevertheless,
membership in the senior ranks of the Ba’ath Party
did not protect individuals from Saddam’s terror,
which was applied to them to ensure that rival centers
of power did not develop within the party.15 Saddam
was particular wary of ambitious “overachievers”
who might be interested in political advancement in
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ways that could eventually lead to the rise of political
competitors. He was also deeply wary of those officials
who began to appear too pious. Saddam further had
an occasional need for visible Ba’athist victims to reinforce the determination of the remaining Ba’athists
to show unquestioning obedience and subservience.
Senior leaders such as Tariq Aziz were sometimes
publicly embarrassed by Saddam, as when he was
told to lose weight and had his weekly progress reported in the newspaper.16 More ominously, a casual
joke about Saddam or his priorities could result in the
loss of a senior leader’s tongue.17 Everyone within the
Iraqi political leadership understood that they had
no rights that Saddam could not immediately nullify
if he chose to do so for whatever reason. This principle applied to the top elite as well as the oppressed
masses. Thus, when Saddam was ousted in 2003, some
Ba’athists as well as non-Ba’athists were open to the
idea of participating in the building of a new Iraq if
they had the opportunity. The most likely exceptions
to this approach would be those Ba’athists who were
implicated in Saddam’s crimes. These people knew
there would never be any kind of future for them in
an Iraq without Saddam or at least a Saddamist type
of system.
THE DE-BA’ATHIFICATION ORDER
OF MAY 16, 2003
Under the circumstances noted above, the Iraq
population was confused and uncertain about what
would happen to the Ba’athists once Saddam’s regime was removed from power. While General Tommy Franks had abolished the Ba’ath Party in a 2003
message to the Iraqi people, he gave little indication
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of how individual Ba’athists outside of Iraq’s top
circles would be treated. In the immediate aftermath
of Saddam’s ouster, both the U.S. military and the
newly established Organization for Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) seemed to be
showing some clear flexibility. ORHA was willing to
allow former Ba’athist administrators and professionals such as doctors and professors to keep their jobs
so long as they were not implicated in regime crimes
and were willing to renounce their previous Ba’athist
affiliations.18 This approach was viewed as necessary
to keep the economy from further declining or even
collapsing. The U.S. Army also showed considerable
pragmatism by sponsoring renunciation ceremonies
in which thousands of people burned their Ba’ath
membership cards, renounced violence, and pledged
to help build the new Iraq.19 This approach was particularly successful in the area around Mosul, where
then Major General David Petraeus presided over
such ceremonies. Mosul, at this time, remained quiet,
despite its tradition of supplying large numbers of
Sunni Arab officers to the Iraqi military. Later, after more comprehensive de-Ba’athification policies
were instituted over the objection of the U.S. military
leadership there, everything changed, Mosul became
much more difficult to manage, and a strong al-Qaeda
presence was established in the region.
As noted above, the more tolerant approach of
ORHA was not to last. An order to de-Ba’athify Iraqi
society was the first major official act of Ambassador L.
Paul Bremer upon his arrival in that country to assume
control of the newly created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which replaced ORHA. Bremer issued
this order on May 16, 2003, after being provided with
the directive in draft form by Undersecretary of De-
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fense for Policy Douglas Feith. According to Bremer,
Feith told him that such an order was absolutely essential to Iraq’s rehabilitation.20 The order disestablished the Ba’ath Party and removed members of the
four highest ranks of the party from government positions. It also banned them from future employment in
the public sector. Additionally, the order required that
anyone holding positions in the top three management
layers in government institutions be interviewed to
determine their level of involvement with the Ba’ath
Party as well as their possible involvement in criminal
activities. Those determined to be senior members of
the party were to be removed from their positions and
banned from any future public employment. The order also called for the creation of a rewards program
to pay individuals providing information leading to
the capture of senior Ba’ath Party members.
The supporters of the de-Ba’athification program
frequently maintained that this approach was inspired
by the de-Nazification efforts that followed World
War II in Germany. Iraqi exiles were fond of the term,
which they may have viewed as loaded in a way that
made it a useful public relations tool to advocate war
and to help clear a way for prominent roles for themselves in the new Iraq. Additionally, some U.S. senior
officials had, by this time, begun viewing Iraq through
the lens of Nazi Germany with Saddam as Hitler and
the Ba’ath Party as the Nazis.21 Such analogies correctly point out the moral repugnancy of the Saddam
Hussein regime, but they also allow one to glance over
the particulars of Iraqi society and argue about Iraq’s
future on the basis of analogies rather than conditions
within Iraq itself. In just one important difference, it
may be significant that the Nazis rose to power as a
large and powerful mass movement, whereas the
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Ba’athists rose to power in Iraq through the actions of
a group of conspirators. Individuals joining the Ba’ath
movement after it seized power may have done so
with motives other than loyalty to Saddam Hussein.
The de-Ba’athification order and the subsequent
CPA Order #2 (issued shortly afterward on May 23
to disband Iraq’s military and intelligence forces) reflect the priorities of both Under Secretary Feith and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. These
priorities centered on the destruction of all forces
previously involved in supporting the old regime
and particularly those forces that they believed had a
chance of reconstituting that regime. The Ba’ath had a
long history of underground activity as well as a past
pattern of infiltrating key institutions and then attempting to seize power by illegal means. The revival
of Ba’athism through conspiracy and intrigue therefore seemed a realistic danger. Unfortunately, such a
revival was not the only serious danger facing Iraq at
this time, and it was not clearly so dangerous as to
trump all other security concerns. It is also not clear if
the U.S. leadership fully understood the numbers of
enemies that they were making by undertaking such
policies or the backlash such actions could produce.
The possibility that such a backlash could lead to a
serious Sunni military challenge to the new Iraq was
apparently dismissed on the grounds that such “deadenders” were a marginalized force and would not be
able to establish a popular rather than a conspiratorial
movement within Iraqi society. Ahmad Hashim, in
his insightful study of the Iraqi insurgency, quotes an
anonymous U.S. policymaker as stating, “We underestimated their [the Iraqis] capacity to put up resistance.
We underestimated the role of nationalism. And we
overestimated the appeal of liberation [as trumping
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all other considerations for Iraqi political behavior].”22
Another even more biting critic stated that the civilians within the George Bush administration had made
the fundamental mistake of confusing strategy with
ideology.23
Some authors also claim that the CPA’s policies
were deliberately anti-Sunni and pro-Shi’ite because
of a belief within the Bush administration that Sunnis
were more dangerous to U.S. interests, while Shi’ites
were more likely to be grateful to the United States for
ousting Saddam, since they had suffered more under
his regime.24 This charge about administration policymaking is more popular in the Arab World than in the
United States and is difficult to confirm. Some Bush
policymakers did speak forcefully against Sunni control in Iraq, but they justified their concerns around
the theme of democracy rather than the inherent untrustworthiness of the Sunni Arabs.25 In some regional
media, as well as in Iraq, the de-Ba’athification policy
was sometimes referred to as “de-Arabization.”26 The
central tenets of the Ba’ath Party are Arab nationalism,
anti-imperialism, and Arab socialism. Such ideals are
not usually viewed as offensive by themselves, and
many Arabs consider them to be noble and praiseworthy. Treating Ba’athism, instead of Saddam’s version
of Ba’athism, as corrupt was therefore a problem for
many Arabs and the pan-Arab media including the
satellite television stations where Iraqis often sought
to get the news.
In an effort that further complicated the situation,
some leading Iraqi Shi’ites attempted to play upon
U.S. fears by suggesting that Sunnis were “Arab nationalists.” This is a label that is seldom viewed as a
slur in the Arab World, but in this instance was apparently used to suggest an anti-American and anti-
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Israeli worldview. Throughout the years following
the invasion, some Shi’ite leaders consistently sought
to convey the view that Sunnis were irredeemably
wedded to radicalism, and needed to be marginalized
to protect both Iraqi and Shi’ite interests. In one particularly revealing incident, Shi’ite leader Abdulaziz
Hakim made it clear that he supported democracy so
long as his organization and sect benefited from that
democracy. In conversations reported by journalist
Bob Woodward and others, Hakim told members of
the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group that the government of Iraq represented 80 percent of the population of that country (Shi’ites and Kurds) so democracy
was served, and nothing had to be done about the remaining Sunnis.27
When Bremer informed the senior staff of the CPA
(and especially the ORHA holdovers) of the new deBa’athification approach, he met immediate resistance
over the scope of the order that he had brought from
Washington. Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner,
the outgoing Director of ORHA, was reported to have
been disturbed by the order, which he characterized
as “too deep.”28 Charlie Sidell, the Baghdad Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Chief of Station who
worked with Garner during this period, stated, “Well
if you do this, you’re going to drive 30,000 to 50,000
Ba’athists underground by nightfall, and the number
is closer to 50,000 than it is to 30,000.”29 Garner and
Sidell went to Bremer to attempt to dissuade him from
issuing the order until it had been moderated to reflect
the realities that they were facing. They recommended
eliminating the top two levels of Ba’athist leadership,
which was about 6,000 people.30 According to Garner,
Bremer stated, “Look, I have my orders. This is what I
am doing.”31 Since Bremer held the rank of Presiden-
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tial Envoy in direct communication with the President,
it is not immediately clear who issued such orders.
Undersecretary Feith could not have done so on his
own authority. President Bush had previously given
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld managerial control of the occupation, so it is possible that Feith spoke
for Rumsfeld who spoke for Bush and Vice President
Dick Cheney.32 A complicating factor in this situation is that throughout his time in office, Bremer was
willing to ignore the advice of the Defense and State
Departments on other issues later in his tenure. If he
did not do so in this instance, he probably believed in
the policy that was being put forward or considered
it to have come directly from the President. It is also
likely that he did not fully understand the importance
of the advice he was receiving from Garner and the
CIA, since he later stated that he did not recall the conversation.33 Garner left Iraq shortly afterward, sharing
his concerns over de-Ba’athification with U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Deputy Commander then
Lieutenant General John Abizaid, who also feared that
the deep de-Ba’athification effort would feed the developing resistance.34 General Abizaid would become
CENTCOM commander after General Franks’ retirement.
In a related event, President Bush later appeared
to blame Bremer for disbanding the Iraqi Army (although not for deep de-Ba’athification), suggesting
that presidential guidance on one of the most important issues of the occupation was not reflected in CPA
decisionmaking. Rather, Bush told journalist Robert
Draper, “The policy had been to keep the [Iraqi] army
intact. Didn’t happen.”35 Bremer responded angrily
to the President’s statement, saying that he had been
ordered to disband the Army by Rumsfeld, and the
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White House had approved the move. He also made
the unusual claim that disbanding the Iraqi Army had
been the correct choice, but he was not the one responsible for this decision.36 Clearly, these are very different versions of the truth, and no one wants to take
responsibility for disbanding Iraqi security forces in
spite of Bremer’s professed belief that it had been the
correct approach. Despite this inconsistency, Bremer’s
arguments have a certain level of resonance, since it is
difficult to believe that he would have implemented
such dramatic policy changes without at least a general understanding of President Bush’s priorities on
de-Ba’athification and the future of the Iraqi military.
At this point, Bremer was imposing Washington’s
priorities and appeared primarily concerned about
preventing the possible reconstitution of the Ba’ath
regime. These fears may have been enhanced by Saddam’s status as a fugitive at that time. Moreover,
Bremer also entered Iraq with the determination to
establish himself quickly as a decisive leader willing
to make decisions that were unpopular with his staff,
the military, and others in the U.S. Government. In his
book, Bremer relates an incident in which his son gave
him a pair of desert combat boots as a going away gift
with the note that they were to help him “kick some
butt.”37 He was apparently in total agreement with
that sentiment.38 Bremer clearly felt that asserting his
will over subordinates was exceptionally important if
he was to maintain effective control of the CPA and
Iraqi policy.39 He made this effort in the face of considerable local unhappiness about CPA policy, and deBa’athification was especially unpopular in the U.S.
military because U.S. officers lost their hardest working and most competent counterparts.40 In response to
the order, some commanders, and most notably Gen-
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eral Petraeus, sought wide authority to grant waivers from the de-Ba’athificaiton requirements for local
individuals to limit the disruptions caused by this
policy.41
Bremer claims in his book that he expected the
de-Ba’athification order to be applied to only about
20,000 people, or what he identified as 1 percent of all
party members. The program would therefore include
the ranks officially designated as “Senior Party Members.” Bremer also claims to have been sensitive to the
needs of lower-ranking Ba’ath Party members to join
the organization to make a living. He later maintained
that his order was applied in ways that he never intended, and that many more people were purged than
he had envisioned under the original program. This
included people of much lower rank than the levels
of Ba’ath membership outlined in the order as well as
individuals whose links to the Ba’ath Party leadership
were tenuous at best. He was also apparently unresponsive to Ambassador Barbara Bodine’s argument
made earlier to General Garner that some senior members of the party were not criminals, while various junior members had engaged in serious crimes, making
a blanket approach based on rank alone unfair and
ineffective.42
Another problem for the CPA was that the justice
of the de-Ba’athification order was not clear to many
Iraqis. Joining the Ba’ath Party in Saddam’s Iraq was
a rational decision for anyone seeking to feed their
family and live in conditions other than squalor and
poverty. The best and most numerous jobs in Iraq are
found in the government and in state-controlled enterprises such as the oil industry. In Iraq, as in most
Middle Eastern countries, there is not a strong private
sector with a wide variety of good jobs. Socialism and
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state control of the economy were official parts of the
Ba’ath ideology, further weakening the nongovernmental sector, while years of United Nations (UN)
sanctions (1990-2003) undermined foreign investment
in the Iraqi economy and also retarded private sector
development. Yet, it is also within the government
that one was most vulnerable to pressure to show
enthusiasm for Saddam’s rule. In this environment,
the greatest and most direct system of rewards and
punishment had been put into place for rewarding
loyalty to the government and the party. In Iraq, a
non-Ba’athist primary school teacher would usually
be paid the equivalent of U.S. $4 per month, while a
Ba’athist in the same position, doing the same work,
would be paid around $200 per month.43
Unfortunately, Bremer’s estimate of 20,000 people
being purged as a result of his order did not hold up.
While exact numbers are impossible to obtain, most
estimates place the number as at least 30,000 and
possibly up to 50,000 individuals.44 A few estimates
place it even higher and note that the party members’
families, as well as ousted Ba’athists, were harmed
by the mass firings.45 Blanket de-Ba’athification punished Iraq’s managerial class merely for being part
of that class, and not because of individual misconduct, abuse of power, or other crimes. Moreover,
other choices were available to address the problem,
although they clearly would have been more cumbersome. According to one observer, the best alternative
would have been to place the Ba’athists on trial and
then punish those found guilty of human rights violations, corruption, incompetence, and other crimes. A
truth and reconciliation commission could then have
been established along South African lines. Such an
option would have avoided the approach of treating
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all Ba’athists in responsible positions as criminals.46
Additionally, there was also the possibility supported
by Garner and others to dismiss only the top two levels of the Ba’ath Party leadership and thereby try to
avoid plunging Iraq into an administrative vacuum
by eliminating managers and technocrats, many of
whom were only “nominal Ba’athists.”47
As will be examined later, Bremer maintains that
his de-Ba’athification order was issued with a full understanding of the complexities of Iraqi society, but it
was overzealously applied. Yet, if Bremer’s authority
and the approach of his order were abused, he still
cannot be fully absolved for the difficulties that followed. In addition to problems with the decision itself, it is unclear that the CPA leadership paid enough
attention to how his order was being implemented
throughout the process rather than simply issuing a
fiat and expecting it to be carried forward without difficulty, first under the authority of the CPA and then
by the Iraqi government. Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez, a former commander in Iraq, excoriated the
CPA on these grounds noting, “[T]he CPA treated [deBa’athification] like they were issuing an academic,
theoretical paper. They simply released the order and
declared success. But there was no vision, no concept,
and in my opinion, no desire to ensure that the policy
was properly implemented. On the other hand, it did
look good on paper.”48
While Bremer was to become more pragmatic over
time, his first few days in Iraq resulted in what have
arguably emerged as some of the worst mistakes associated with the war, and these mistakes were impossible to reverse by the time he started to understand
their negative implications.49 It is nevertheless also
useful to understand the context of Bremer’s actions
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by looking at the reaction to these policies in Washington. In his memoir, Douglas Feith minimizes the chaos
created by de-Ba’athification, and takes issue with
Bremer’s later second thoughts about the policy.50 Unlike Bremer, he was unprepared to admit that the deBa’athification policy may have been producing bad
results. Rather than adjust his focus to the real and
emerging problems as Bremer eventually did, Feith, at
least publicly, continued to support policies that were
proving disastrous.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DE-BA’ATHIFICATION PROGRAM
Nine days after the issuance of CPA Order Number 1, Bremer established a de-Ba’athification Council, which he was to supervise and which would
report “directly and solely” to him.51 Later, on November 3, 2003, the responsibility for implementing
de-Ba’athification was passed from the CPA to the
U.S.-created Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).52 The IGC
made de-Ba’athification the responsibility of Governing Council member Ahmad Chalabi, who was placed
in charge of the newly-created “Supreme National
Commission for De-Ba’athification.” Chalabi was supported in his efforts at deep de-Ba’athification by the
Shi’ite religious parties such as Dawa and the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, later
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) and by various Kurdish groups. Former post-Saddam Defense
Minister Ali Allawi (not to be confused with Ayad
Allawi) describes Iraqi Kurds as favoring broad deBa’athification, but with so many exceptions that their
actual priorities were difficult to sort out.53 Most Sunni
Iraqi Arabs did not favor deep de-Ba’athification, al-
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though many of them had also suffered under Saddam
Hussein. Additionally, it did not escape Sunni Arab
attention that the primary Iraqi champions of deep deBa’athification were formerly exiled Shi’ite politicians
such as Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress
and Abdul Azziz Hakim of SCIRI. Many Sunni Iraqi
Arabs considered “de-Ba’athification” to be synonymous with “de-Sunnization,” a strong and deliberate
effort to marginalize the role of the Sunni Arab community in Iraq’s political future.54
The de-Ba’athification process impacted every important aspect of Iraqi economic life, due to the centrality of state-run enterprises to the Iraqi economy.
These included the educational system, utilities, food
distribution centers, and the oil industry. The possibility that Ba’athists would be educating young people
was of special concern to those in favor of deep deBa’athification. Consequently, the de-Ba’athification
order was used to justify the immediate firing of 1,700
university professors and staff throughout Iraq, although no one maintained that they were all complicit
in Saddam’s crimes or even that they were committed
Ba’ath ideologues.55 Rather, they were often simply attempting to get by within the Saddamist system that
permeated the state. The post-Saddam former prime
minister Ayad Allawi has referred to this approach
as Iraqi citizens using Ba’athist membership as a “vehicle to live.”56 Later, Bremer expressed unhappiness
that “tens of thousands” of school teachers (K-12)
had been dismissed from their jobs, even though they
were only low-ranking members of the Ba’ath Party
who had been forced to join as a condition of their employment.57 He strongly disapproved of such actions,
but by this time much of the de-Ba’athification process had moved out of his direct control and was be-
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ing managed by either Chalabi or by local committees
that had set themselves up using Bremer’s order as the
rationale for their activities. Chalabi, who had strong
allies in the U.S. civilian leadership of the Pentagon,
may have been particularly difficult for Bremer to
moderate. Much later, in retrospect, Bremer indicated
that de-Ba’athification should have been conducted
by a judicial body rather than a commission led by
Iraqi politicians.58
The collapse of large segments of the Iraqi educational system harmed not only teachers but students
and Iraqi families by rendering schools and universities increasingly dysfunctional. It also created pools of
high school and college age males who could sometimes be approached about the possibility of participating in the insurgency. Other state-controlled bureaucracies were decapitated as well, but these leadership
gaps did not always last for long. In the south and the
Shi’ite sections of Baghdad, Shi’ite clergy and their
supporters quickly established their leadership over
a variety of local government institutions.59 Many of
these people were affiliated with Muqtada Sadr’s Sadr
II movement (so named to indicate continuity with his
murdered father’s charitable activities). Holdover officials within the establishments seized by the Sadrists
or other groups were quickly made to feel unwelcome
or even in danger unless they pledged loyalty to the
new leadership. These new political leaders often had
no concept of the technical or administrative issues
associated with the enterprises that they seized. Nevertheless, the rise of Shi’ite clerics to fill the political
vacuum in their own community is not surprising.
The Shi’ite political establishment was one of the only
organized forces outside of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq
at the time of the invasion. Moreover, it had a strong
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and loyal following, a system of self-financing, and
a record of long-standing persecution by the regime.
Later, the Sadrists lost some of their initial power following Muqtada Sadr’s political and military confrontations with the Iraq government led by rival Shi’ite
politician Nuri al-Maliki.
Many Ba’athists who held ranks below the highest
four levels of the Ba’ath Party were also purged under the 2003 de-Ba’athification order, because it was
often difficult to discern an individual’s rank within
the Ba’ath Party. Often such standing was not clear
to those around the person, and a large number of records were destroyed in the immediate aftermath of
the invasion and the looting of Iraqi government offices that occurred following the fall of the Saddam
regime. Individuals who held important administrative positions were therefore often simply assumed to
be high-ranking Ba’athists and removed from office.
Ironically, some individuals who were not important
in the Ba’ath Party were strong pro-Saddam sympathizers, while some important Ba’athists sought to rise
within the Iraqi government and bureaucracy through
whatever means available. Allowing junior officials
to assume the jobs of their former superiors did not
necessarily lead to a bureaucracy that was inherently
more anti-Saddam or pro-democracy.
The decision to place Chalabi in charge of the deBa’athification process was also unfortunate. At least
some U.S. leaders were aware of exactly what they were
getting with a Chalabi-led de-Ba’athification Commission, and they should have understood that he was
not likely to show restraint on this issue.60 Chalabi had
been an advocate for wide-ranging de-Ba’athification
well before the war against Saddam had begun in
2003. He had previously published his concerns that
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the United States would invade Iraq but would not attempt to eliminate all aspects of the Ba’ath Party with
the comprehensiveness that he favored. In a February
19, 2002, Wall Street Journal editorial, Chalabi attacked
what he called the plans for the future occupation of
Iraq, which he apparently believed he understood on
the basis of testimony before Congress by U.S. military and Bush administration officials. According to
Chalabi, “[T]he proposed U.S. occupation and military administration of Iraq is unworkable. Unworkable because it is predicated on keeping Saddam’s existing structures of government in place—albeit under
American officers.”61 He went on to claim that, “Iraq
needs a comprehensive program of de-Ba’athification
even more extensive than the de-Nazification effort in
Germany after World War II.”
Chalabi has often been identified as the least popular member of the Governing Council among the Iraqi
population at the time of his appointment by the IGC
to head the de-Ba’athification Commission. His status as an exile caused at least some to view him as
an outsider who had no experiences of the challenge
of living under Saddam.62 The strong and public ties
Chalabi held to both Israelis and pro-Israeli figures
in the U.S. Government were well-known and not
universally appreciated throughout Iraq.63 Later, the
December 2005 elections underscored his unpopularity when his political party failed to win a single
seat in the 475-person Parliament, despite a massive
political campaign under the slogan, “We Liberated
Iraq.”64 The decision to move forward with Chalabi
at the head of the Commission rather than seeking a
more reconciliation-oriented figure indicated a continuing determination to impose a harsh peace on the
Sunnis and anyone associated with the old regime.
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This approach was consistent with the priorities of the
senior Pentagon civilians who remained concerned
that a regime similar to the one led by Saddam could
reemerge. This danger was also worrisome to many
of Iraq’s Shi’ite and Kurdish leaders who were aware
that the Ba’ath had previously come to power twice
through coups.
As noted, the Shi’ite religious parties and other
community leaders were among the groups most interested in comprehensive de-Ba’athification priorities.
U.S. policymakers seeking to justify a more sweeping
de-Ba’athification policy were quick to point out that
failure to do this would potentially harm U.S. relations
with these parties.65 Nor is it difficult to understand
the intense hatred Shi’ites and Kurds held for Saddam
and the Ba’ath. Shi’ite religious parties, as well as the
Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi Communist Party, had suffered intensively under Saddam, and most prominent
members of these organizations had lost a number of
friends and family members to torture and execution
by the regime. The rise of a Shi’ite Islamic republic in
Iran through revolution was particularly frightening
to Saddam, who unleashed an especially high level of
brutality against Iraqi Shi’ites who seemed even the
slightest bit comfortable with the Iranian concept of
Islamic government. An overly political definition of
Shi’ite identity during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was
especially dangerous. Nevertheless, revenge (or justice) was not the only motivation for the Shi’ite parties in supporting de-Ba’athification. Many of these
groups also wanted as much power as possible for
themselves. Destroying the political viability of the
Sunni leadership in Iraq helped to move them toward
that goal. Some Shi’ite leaders may have also hoped
to reverse the situations of Sunnis and Shi’ites perma-

28

nently. In contrast to Iraq’s first 8 decades of existence,
Shi’ites would hold the important positions, and Sunnis would be politically marginalized. Under these
circumstances, some Sunni Arabs believed that they
were being offered second-class citizenship at best.
The CPA de-Ba’athification order was sometimes
taken as at least a partial green light for some Iraqis
to exact revenge on former Ba’athists who had persecuted them or were their personal enemies. Indeed, a Shi’ite assassination campaign against former
Ba’athists did take place, although it is doubtful that
a more reconciliationist approach by the CPA would
have prevented these outbreaks of violence, once the
dictatorship had been removed. 66 Many of these assassinations were carried forward in a highly professional manner, rather than as frenzy or sloppy revenge attacks. It is correspondingly possible, if not likely, that
Iranian intelligence units coordinated with friendly
Shi’ite groups to ensure that Ba’athist enemies of Tehran were never in a position for them to cause trouble
for Iran again.67 According to the London-based newsmagazine, The Middle East, Iranian Supreme leader Ali
Khamenei put the commander of the al-Quds Force
in charge of setting up a network of covert operatives
in Iraq as early as September 2002, with the mission
of expanding Iranian influence in that country in the
aftermath of the invasion.68
If Chalabi hoped to use the de-Ba’athification Commission as an avenue for his own rise to power, he
was deeply disappointed by the outcome of the 2005
election. While he may have helped to create a power
vacuum by purging a number of potential rivals, he
did not have the ability to fill it through the electoral
process. Rather, the most important players in Iraq at
this stage were quickly proven to be the Shi’ite reli-
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gious parties who were also enthusiastic supporters of
de-Ba’athification. After the election, Chalabi moved
in and out of a variety of governmental jobs, which
he held for various lengths of time. Throughout his
political maneuvering, he was unable to obtain real
power within the top leadership of the government.
As noted above, many Iraqi Sunnis viewed the
effort to remove large numbers of Sunni leaders and
bureaucrats from power through the vehicle of deBa’athification as part of a new political system in
which Shi’ites would dominate Sunnis. The politicization of sectarian differences also led Iraqi political parties to adapt an approach whereby they viewed failing
to fill a political post with one of your supporters or
allies as tantamount to allowing that post to be filled
by enemies.69 In addition to Sunni Muslims, some
“establishment Shi’ites” had also risen to high ranks
within the Ba’ath Party and were also caught up in deBa’athification. A key problem here is that Saddam actively reached out to secular Shi’ites to serve as “democratic ornaments,” while attempting to marginalize
the Shi’ite clergy, which he felt was at least potentially
loyal to Iran. 70 Some secular Shi’ite leaders, including
those with advanced degrees from Western universities, took the bait for a variety of reasons including
the hope that they could gain some reasonable level of
patronage for their own communities. Some of these
people were also well-educated and talented enough
to be of real use to the regime in performing administrative tasks. These links with the regime allowed such
individuals to become targets for de-Ba’athification in
ways that the more persecuted opposition clerics did
not once the regime had been removed.71
The most prominent example of the problems
faced by “establishment Shi’ites” was the case of Saa-
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doun Hammadi, the former Iraqi premier who died
of leukemia in Germany in March 2007.72 Saadoun
Hammadi had previously served as Iraq’s Foreign
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister, and
most recently, Saddam’s last Speaker of the Assembly, thus becoming the highest ranking Shi’ite within
the regime. Hammadi held a Ph.D. in economics from
the University of Wisconsin and has been described
as having a “thoughtful and scholarly demeanor.”73
He also is the author of a number of academic articles
on Arab affairs and political philosophy.74 Hammadi
favored economic and political liberalism in the past,
and was presented to the world as a reform prime
minister after the 1991 Gulf War. He apparently took
his reform charter a little too seriously for Saddam
and was removed for overzealousness after 7 months
in power.75
As an articulate, respected Shi’ite intellectual who
held high-profile/high-prestige government positions, Hammadi helped give Saddam’s government
the appearance of broad-based Iraqi support across religious sects. Saddam thus presented Hammadi with
the option of being co-opted and in return gaining a
few crumbs of power for himself and some economic
assistance for his Shi’ite supporters. This Faustian
bargain was occasionally made available to Westerneducated secular intellectuals, but it was almost never
an option for important members of the Shi’ite clergy.
Although Saddam sometimes sought to appear religious, formal clerical participation in the Ba’athist
government was largely unacceptable to him. Certainly, no ayatollah would hold any of the governmental
positions Hammadi held. Hammadi was arrested and
placed in prison shortly after the U.S.-led invasion,
while his son and members of his al-Karakshah tribe
stringently protested his arrest on grounds that he did
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not take part in any crime against the Iraqi people.76
He was released in February 2004, in partial response
to the uproar within the Shi’ite community. He then
traveled to a series of Arab countries and then to Germany where he died.
Other secular Shi’ite leaders were also tarnished
by their association with Saddam’s government, although they collaborated for a mix of personal, communal, and national motives. They were, however,
not always subject to the same level of punishment as
Sunni Ba’athists. According to the International Crisis
Group (ICG), Shi’ite political parties involved with the
de-Ba’athification process often allowed Shi’ite Ba’ath
Party members to repent and keep their jobs. In doing so, the former Ba’athists became subservient to the
parties that allowed them to remain in their positions
and vulnerable to pressure from these parties so long
as they remained a relevant political force.77 Any former Ba’athists showing much independence from the
new political leadership at this stage usually found
themselves accused of leaking information to terrorists
or a variety of other crimes, regardless of whether or
not they had done anything wrong. De-Ba’athification
consequently may have helped the Shi’ite clergy and
religious parties establish almost full control over the
Shi’ite community during the first years following the
invasion. While Shi’ite secularists, including those associated with the Ba’ath, were not punished to the extent of Sunni Ba’athists under de-Ba’athification, they
were also not in a position to seek the leadership of
the Shi’ite community. At this time, there seemed to
be limited room for a reformed anti-Iranian secularist
leadership that included ex-Ba’athists in Iraq.78
The removal of Ba’athist officials also created
problems in finding suitable replacements with satisfactory political credentials. Some individuals who
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had been fired by Ba’athists from various bureaucracies under the Ba’athist regime became strong candidates to replace them following the change of regime.
The problem here is that such individuals sometimes
(perhaps often) were fired for nonpolitical reasons,
including incompetence and corruption. Upon being
returned to their former jobs or those of their former
supervisors, they returned to old patterns of behavior,
showing little responsibility, effectiveness, or commitment to even a limited work ethic. To be fair, it might
be noted that these people had no monopoly on the
shortcomings noted here. Most Iraqis had never had
any preparation to work in an efficient, modernizing
bureaucracy, and corruption permeated the society
during the Saddam years as it still does.79
At various times, the Iraqi government announced
that it was relaxing the de-Ba’athificiation policy, often as a response to U.S. pressure. Chalabi would usually announce the policy “changes” and then provide
grandiose projections of how many people would be
rehabilitated under new more lenient rules. In early
2007, for instance, he publicly agreed to soften the
de-Ba’athification policy, announcing that his office
had begun removing hiring restrictions from former
Ba’athists who had not committed crimes during the
Saddam years. Elaborating on this change, he stated
that more than 2,300 former high-ranking Ba’ath Party
members were either being reinstated in their former
jobs or granted pensions.80 On the same day, Chalabi
stated that over 700 former Ba’athists had returned to
their old government jobs, suggesting that the balance
of the 2,300 people he cited were given pensions if his
figures are correct.81 Chalabi’s commitment to reform
nevertheless remained tactical, and there is no independent evidence for the figures he cited. Additional-
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ly, Chalabi opposed any new law on de-Ba’athification
that would contain a sunset clause that would abolish
the commission at some future point.82
An interesting window into the impartiality of the
de-Ba’athification process occurred with the August
2008 arrest of Ali Faisal al-Lami, then the executive director of the de-Ba’athification Commission. Al-Lami
was arrested as he returned home from Lebanon as
a “suspected senior special group leader,” according
to journalistic sources.83 Various offshoots of Muqtada
al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and other pro-Iranian terrorist organizations are known as “special groups” and
are among the most extreme forces within the Iraqi
political system. Some of these groups are controlled
by Iranian intelligence organizations such as the alQuds Force.84 The idea that someone comfortable with
this ideology was presiding over de-Ba’athification
is bone-chilling. Chalabi nevertheless demanded alLami’s release following the arrest.85 He stated that
al-Lami played “a great essential role [in] fighting
and confronting Saddam’s regime despite the risks
that surrounded him.”86 He further added that U.S.
forces pay “no attention to Iraqi human rights.” While
many details of this situation were not disclosed and
al-Lami’s guilt remained publicly unproven, his purported admiration for Tehran further reinforced the
image of the de-Ba’athification Commission as hopelessly biased against Sunni Arabs. Al-Lami remained
in detention until August 2009, when he was released
as part of an agreement between the Iraqi government
and various Shi’ite parties.87 After his release, al-Lami
returned to political and de-Ba’athification activities,
as noted later in this monograph. Al-Lami’s role in
de-Ba’athification ended in May 2011 when he was assassinated by unknown gunmen who were probably
members of al-Qaeda.88
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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF
DE-BA’ATHIFICATION
The decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army and the
Ba’ath Party within the first few days of establishing the CPA administered an overwhelming blow to
organized Iraqi life. This radical shock therapy was
deemed by some members of the Bush administration
as vital to the establishment of a stable democracy in
Iraq. Of all of the CPA actions in this time frame, the
abolition of the Iraqi Army was the most controversial
and disconcerting to many Iraqis, who often viewed
the military as something more than a pillar of the Saddam Hussein regime. Supporters of the decision often
claim that the Iraqi Army dissolved itself, and that the
reality of the post-war situation was simply being recognized. This argument implies that the United States
only had only two choices, reconstituting the 600,000man Iraqi Army in its Saddamist form or bringing the
Iraqi Army down to zero. The choice, however, was
never that binary, and the CPA order was issued at a
point when U.S. Army General David D. McKiernan
and various CIA officials were already working on a
third option, that of reconstituting certain units of the
Iraqi military on a voluntary basis under vetted officers.89 These efforts had to be discontinued following
the CPA announcement.
Armed resistance to U.S. forces at some level following the invasion was probably inevitable, no matter how well the post-war reconstruction effort was
handled. The question was, would this resistance
comprise small groups of terrorists or would it encompass much larger forces drawn from alienated
social groups that were able to organize into a strong
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network of resistance organizations. At this stage in
the conflict, the Bush administration was loath to admit that segments of the Iraqi population were waging
war against U.S. forces rather than welcoming them.
At a June 2003 press conference, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld stated, “I guess the reason I don’t use the
phrase ‘guerrilla war’ is because there isn’t one.”90 In
general, the administration seemed to believe that the
Iraqis would be sufficiently grateful for liberation that
they would be granted sweeping ability to do anything
they wanted in Iraq without much of a backlash.91 This
view was emphatically reinforced by some of the most
pro-war Iraqi exiles who maintained that Iraqis were
so oppressed that they did not care about much else
other than their deliverance from Saddam Hussein.92
The de-Ba’athification order, as unpopular as it was
with Sunni Arab Iraqis, was not as unpopular as the
disbanding of the Iraqi Army. Yet, if the United States
was determined to implement a de-Ba’athification
order, the rationale for dissolving the Army becomes
much less clear. Senior Ba’athist officers could have
been retired under the de-Ba’athification order, and
low-ranking Ba’athists and non-Ba’athists could have
been offered the option to remain in the military provided that they were not complicit in regime crimes.
Ba’ath political officers, who were often resented by
regular army officers, could easily have been removed
from service, and elite units with special loyalty to
Saddam could have been dissolved.93 The Iraqi Army
under new leadership could then have been used to
help provide order rather than be left disgraced with
many of its members facing destitution. The special
relationship of the Iraqi Army to Iraqi society went far
beyond Saddam. Even a number of anti-Saddam Iraqi
exiles urged that it not be abolished.94
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The alternative to abolishing the Army in addition
to wide-ranging de-Ba’athification would have been
to purge and restructure the Army. This would involve removing the political functionaries and special
security forces that served throughout the military to
ensure loyalty to Saddam’s regime. The special security forces involved in this effort were commanded
by Saddam’s younger son, Qusay, and were given
sweeping powers to meddle in the operations of military units despite their lack of competence in military
matters. The political officials were generally detested
by the professional military, who would have welcomed efforts to rid the Army of such officials.95 Most
would also have been pleased to end the long hours of
ideological instruction that were supposed to support
morale and readiness, but in effect detracted from unit
preparation for military missions. The presence of
these political units, the use of purges, and the general
distrust Saddam felt for any gifted military leaders often caused many Iraqi Army officers to feel that they
were victims of the regime rather than a part of it. It
was, therefore, a deep shock to such individuals when
the order was issued to disband them including those
units that had chosen not to fight against the U.S.-led
invasion.
Additionally, Saddam’s primary means of control
over the military was the Ba’ath Party functionaries
(“commissars”) noted above rather than insisting that
all high-ranking officers join the Ba’ath. According
to Colonel John Agoglia who served as a CENTCOM
planner during this time frame:
[I]n June, we found the personnel records of the Iraqi
Army at the Ministry of Defense, and we had those
computers that contained those personnel records ex-
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amined by special technical experts. The special technical experts confirmed in fact that the records were
authentic and not tampered with. One of the key findings of those records which was shared with [CPA Director for National Security and Defense] Mr. [Walter]
Slocombe, was that in fact you did not have large-scale
Ba’ath issues in the army until you got to the major
general rank, and at the major general rank, 50 percent
of the major generals were Ba’athists and 50 percent
weren’t.96

An important caveat is in order here, since the
Iraqi Army was extremely top heavy and had more
than 10,000 generals.97 Nevertheless, the database that
Colonel Agoglia mentions could have been an invaluable tool in reconstituting the Iraqi Army and then
using it to help provide security for the new government. This effort would have to include extensive use
of other intelligence means to confirm all aspects of
the database to the greatest extent possible.
In the aftermath of CPA Orders 1 and 2, Ba’ath officials became natural allies to the angry and financially
troubled ex-soldiers of the Iraqi Army after the Army
was disbanded, with no effort made to recall those
former soldiers who may have remained interested in
serving. The ability of senior Ba’ath leaders to obtain
and provide funding to the insurgency was particularly important in helping to organize it into an effective
force able to include unemployed and desperate Iraqis
willing to strike at U.S. forces for money. Ba’ath funding for such efforts appears to have been drawn from
a variety of sources. Some Ba’ath leaders had significant reserves of cash within Iraq when the invasion occurred. This group included many mid-level Ba’athist
officials as well as more senior leaders.98 Others had
access to funds in foreign banks, particularly in Syria.
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The Syrians, at this time, seemed willing to turn a
blind eye to many provocative Iraqi Ba’athist activities
out of some ideological kinship and, more concretely,
from a fear that Damascus might also be targeted for a
U.S.-led regime change, unless the United States was
bogged down elsewhere. Saddam loyalists who were
trusted enough to have access to millions of dollars
from the old regime were naturally few in number,
but their ability to provide funding to unemployed exsoldiers at the early stages of the occupation served as
the lifeblood of the emerging insurgency. Later, the insurgency was to become dominated by al-Qaeda radicals, with their own funding sources from outside the
country (as well as various “taxes” and asset seizures
within Iraq). The senior Ba’athists able to distribute
money would probably have remained committed enemies of the new Iraq under any conceivable scenario,
but it would have been much more difficult for them
to establish the initial insurgent networks without the
large and discontented groups created by CPA Orders
1 and 2.
According to Stanford professor and former CPA
senior administrator Larry Diamond, there were important warning signs that the former Iraqi officers
would create severe problems if they were not given
other options than simply walking away from their
military careers with virtually nothing. Bremer did not
seem prepared to listen or initially adjust his policies
on military pensions and possible return to service by
vetted individuals in the face of changing events. According to Diamond, “Bremer has set out on a decisive
course—establishing the American political occupation of Iraq, dissolving the Iraqi Army and instituting a sweeping process of de-Ba’athification—and he
did not want to be steered off course.”99 The refusal
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to adjust course may also have been reinforced by the
mindset continuing to pervade the highest levels of
the U.S. Government that almost all Iraqis were happy
to be liberated from Saddam and that the resistance
had no real social or political base to draw upon.
CPA Order 22 issued in August 2003 created the
New Iraqi Army. The order forbade the inclusion of
senior Ba’ath Party members in the Iraqi Army without the specific permission of the CPA. Additionally,
all officers who had held the rank of colonel or above
were excluded from being rehired, including those
who had not resisted the U.S. invasion and were not
members of the Ba’ath Party. CPA guidance suggested that all colonels and above were to be considered as
committed Ba’athists, despite the bloated senior ranks
of the Iraqi military, in which colonels did jobs that
would be assigned to much lower-ranking officers in
Western armies. The initial U.S. decision to recreate
the Iraqi Army as a small force of only around 40,000
troops equipped with only light arms was an additional problem.100 The abolition of the Ba’ath Party and
the old army created a vast pool of enemies for the
United States to deal with, while the decision to create
only a small Iraqi military to cope with the discontent
was a major problem. The most frequent explanation
for this action is that U.S. leaders feared a militarized
state that would threaten its neighbors and possibly
mount a coup against a democratic government. The
second point is particularly important since it relates
back to the central U.S. fear that a new Ba’athist regime could somehow emerge through the vehicle of
a military coup. Such concerns are valid, but no Iraqi
government would be able to establish domestic legitimacy without being able to provide security for its
population, and the Iraqi government was being set
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up to fail on these grounds. The U.S. delay in recognizing the dangers inherent in Iraq’s lack of adequate
military forces correspondingly gave the Iraqi insurgents huge advantages in establishing control over areas that would subsequently be outside the control of
the central government. The U.S. leadership therefore
made a deliberate decision to deny Iraq the type of
force that could allow the Iraqi government to survive
in the absence of U.S. forces in order to ensure that a
Ba’athist coup from the military could not take place,
although U.S. leaders did not seem to see this as the
trade-off at the time.
The Ba’ath Party’s “Political and Strategic Program,” issued after Saddam’s ouster, stated that
its immediate priority was to “expel the occupation
forces from Iraq and preserve the country as a unified
homeland for all Iraqis.”101 Alienated Ba’athists did
not, however, always join Ba’ath resistance organizations to fight against the Coalition and the Iraqi government. Many who wanted to fight reached out to
violent Islamist groups after repenting their “sins” of
supporting Saddam’s secular regime.102 These people
then fought against the United States and the Iraqi
government as supposed Islamic warriors. Some of
this solidarity may have resulted from a decision by
various Sunnis to resist the Shi’ite-dominated government by whatever means available. More pragmatically, there is also the possibility that over time the
Islamist groups would be more effective than the
Ba’athists in finding foreign sources of funding. Some
Sunni Iraqi leaders were also forced, or at least strongly pressured, to support the fighting by al-Qaeda once
it had established itself in that country. Many insurgents would again change sides when their al-Qaeda
allies became too authoritarian to tolerate and when
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the United States offered to fund the anti-al-Qaeda,
“Awakening Councils.”
The ability of Iranian intelligence and paramilitary
organizations to function in Iraq was also aided by the
portion of CPA Order 2 dissolving Iraqi intelligence
organizations. This order and the de-Ba’athification
order made it difficult, if not impossible, to return
key personnel to intelligence duties focused on antiIranian counterintelligence and the containment of
Iranian power. This situation is especially tricky since
the intelligence organizations were important pillars
of the regime, and were correspondingly riddled with
potential war criminals and human rights violators.
Saddam first came to power by consolidating his control over these organizations, and it appears that his
youngest legitimate son, Uday, was being groomed
to assume future powers as president by serving an
apprenticeship within the intelligence organizations.
Under a less sweeping purge, trade-offs would have
had to be considered in assessing the criminality of
various officials as juxtaposed against their usefulness in opposing Iran. The example of the CIA’s use
of former German Nazi-era general Reinhard Gehlen
and his intelligence gathering organization against the
Soviet Union after World War II may have served as
a starting point for consideration of how this could be
done.103
EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE EXCESSES OF
DE-BA’ATHIFICATION
The idea that the United States could enter Iraq
and then rapidly depart after removing much of the
leadership from all major administrative structures, as
well as the military as a whole, reflected an optimism
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that was difficult to justify. This belief was influenced
by the experience of some Eastern European countries
where various communist parties were removed from
power without the types of problems that were to occur in Iraq.104 Feith suggests that Iraq could have been
turned over to exiles, but it was certainly not clear how
these people could have established civil order or implemented a set a policies that had already been seen
to create a major Sunni insurgency. In the years since
the invasion, various neoconservatives have stressed
that the United States should have trained a large exile
army prior to invading Iraq and that by choosing not
to do so helped to foreclose the option of installing
exiles.105 This approach was supposed to be based or
at least inspired on the model of the French resistance
in World War II and in some extreme versions may
even have considered Chalabi to be a latter-day General Charles De Gaulle. Even if one accepts the logic
of such an argument, the fact remains that the United
States did not have such a force in place in 2002-03,
and this in no way altered the ideologically based belief that the Iraq war would not require a significant
occupation force to keep order after the Iraqi regime
was defeated and the Iraqi Army was disbanded.
The U.S. difficulties in Iraq may also have increased
due to the hostility of neighboring Arab governments
and populations to policies that they viewed as antiSunni, such as de-Ba’athification. After the ouster of
Saddam’s regime, there were few credible news outlets for average Iraqis to use in an effort to understand
the situation within their country. Newly emerging
Iraqi newspapers were often hopelessly biased and
based on a poor understanding of journalistic standards, which were unknown in Saddam’s Iraq where
the media’s chief function was propaganda dissemi-
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nation. The fledgling Iraqi television network was
almost totally ignored in preference to the pan-Arab
news stations such as al-Jazeera and, to a much lesser
extent, al Arabibiya as well as Iran’s al-Alam news
broadcasts in Arabic. Some of the pan-Arab media
outlets, especially al-Jazeera satellite television, were
particularly hostile to de-Ba’athification Commission
leader Ahmad Chalabi for a variety of reasons, not all
of which involved his activities on the commission.
In response, Chalabi was interviewed on al-Arabiya
television where he stated that al-Jazeera was completely infiltrated by Iraqi intelligence. This statement
is widely viewed as untrue, reckless, and a little desperate. This feud between Chalabi and al- Jazeera continued for some time. 106
Moreover, as the difficulty of stabilizing Iraq became increasingly clear, Bremer became more openly critical of Chalabi’s methods of conducting deBa’athification, which went beyond the scope of the
original order. In April 2004, Bremer moved to narrow
de-Ba’athification in response to the abuse of the system and to establish a more reasonable set of policies
to reverse Iraq’s escalating violence. He stated that the
policy had been applied “unevenly and unfairly.”107
By this time, the crisis between the Sunnis and Shi’ites
was exceptionally serious, and the outlines of a potential civil war were becoming increasingly clear. In
response, Bremer hoped to empower a more reconciliationist Iraqi leadership that would be able to help
stem the tide of insurgency. He believed that he found
the right individual to lead this effort in the person
of Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi’ite leader who believed
in achieving national unity by reaching out to Sunni
Arabs and Kurds.
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Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi was installed in office by the United States on June 1, 2004.
On June 28, 2004, the CPA handed over formal political power to Allawi and the Iraqi Interim Government. Allawi was a longtime opponent of deep deBa’athification, and sought to limit the scope of the
de-Ba’athification effort throughout his time in office.
In a strategic vision that anticipated the Awakening
Councils, he also strongly favored efforts to reconcile
with Iraq insurgents and thus draw them away from
hardcore Saddamists, Iraqi al-Qaeda members, and
foreign terrorists. He also hoped to negotiate with
Iraqi Sunnis and peel them away from their emerging
alliance with foreign fighters such as al-Qaeda in Iraq
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Allawi pushed forward with his efforts at reconciliation by seeking to allow Ba’athists without blood on their hands to return
to state jobs. Chalabi’s de-Ba’athification Commission
seems to have significantly reduced its purges in response to Allawi’s pressure. In justifying this policy,
Allawi stated, “This country needs every single citizen” and “we will not repeat the policies of Saddam
Hussein, who favored some while excluding most of
the population.”108 He is also the only post-2003 Iraqi
Prime Minister not to visit Iran, although he was invited to do so.109
Bremer presented the decision to appoint Ayad Allawi as Interim Prime Minister of Iraq as a decision
made by the Iraqi Governing Council more or less on
its own, which he was asked to ratify. This interpretation of events is almost universally discounted as a
useful fiction designed to help Allawi by indicating
that he was selected by other Iraqis and not by the U.S.
leadership. Most Iraqis believe that the U.S. Government chose Allawi, and this interpretation permeates
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most published accounts of the event. Whatever the
origins of Allawi’s appointment, he nevertheless appeared to have maintained a well-reasoned and forward-looking agenda for the Iraqi future, although
he also had his shortcomings on such issues as controlling corruption. Allawi met Iraqi opposition to
his relaxation of de-Ba’athification from predictable
sources. The leadership of SCIRI stated that “improper persons” were being given positions in the security
field and this was a violation of the principles of the
new Iraqi government.110
Feith states in his memoir that the CIA and State
Department favored the Allawi appointment, but
he felt that Allawi and his party were insufficiently
committed to democracy. He noted that Allawi’s Iraq
National Accord (INA) Party had leaders who were,
“supported by Sunni-controlled Arab governments
[and] wanted the country’s Sunni-controlled military
to continue to play a key role in Iraq.”111 It is interesting that Feith was concerned not simply about the
dangers presented by a Ba’athist leadership for the
Iraqi Army, but he also seems to have been worried
about a Sunni leadership, in general, becoming powerful within Iraq. Additionally, it is not clear why an
exile group receiving support from other Arab countries allied with the United States was considered as
dangerous as Shi’ite parties accepting support from
Iran. Feith also notes his own serious concern about
the Iranian connection to other Iraqi political parties,
but does not appear to view them as any more or less
troubling than Allawi’s links to Arab nations such as
Saudi Arabia.112
Prime Minister Allawi’s strongly reconciliationist approach might have made progress in defeating
the insurgency over time, but the decisive defeat of
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his party in the 2005 elections ended the chances for
his approach to go forward. Sunni Arabs boycotted
the election, and most Shi’ite and Kurdish voters supported parties with a clear and direct sectarian or ethnic agenda. Allawi was also undermined by reports of
staggeringly high levels of corruption in his government (although this scandal did not involve him personally).113 Allawi’s term as prime minister ended on
April 7, 2005, when he turned power over to Ibrahim
Jaffari of the Shi’ite Islamist party, al-Dawa. Jaffari
remained in power until May 2007 and was then followed by Nouri al-Maliki of the same party. Both individuals were selected through a process of internal
bargaining in a Parliament dominated by Shi’ites and,
to a lesser extent, Kurds. Distrust among the Shi’ite
groups led to the choice of two consecutive Dawa
Party prime ministers, since Dawa unlike many of the
other parties has no militia, and its leaders were therefore considered safe compromise candidates.
The principles of the 2003 de-Ba’athification decree were also enshrined in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution
that was largely put together by Shi’ites and Kurds
(Sunni Arabs unwisely boycotted the election for the
Constitutional Assembly). According to Article 131
of the Constitution, “The High Commission for DeBa’athification shall continue its functions as an independent commission, and in coordination with the Judicial Authority and the Executive institutions within
the framework of the laws regulating its functions.
The Commission shall be attached to the Council of
Representatives.” The inclusion of this statement in
the Constitution was not taken well by many Sunnis,
although there were a few limited efforts to reassure
them. The de-Ba’athification Commission became
much more active after Allawi left office and the new
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Constitution was ratified. One of their chief functions
seems to have been removing people who managed
to regain their jobs while Allawi was prime minister.
By the summer of 2006, there was another softening of
de-Ba’athification with significant numbers of people
reportedly returned to the Ministries of Information,
Interior, and Defense.114 By this time, various political
parties had established control over at least some important ministries and the domestic situation in Iraq
appeared at its nadir. Many within the Iraqi government may have felt pressure to announce some progress on reconciliation-related issues simply to prevent
the United States from giving up on Iraq.
THE “ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE
ACT OF 2008”
The passing of the Accountability and Justice Act
in Parliament came in early 2008 and was meant to
reform the process of de-Ba’athification, as well as reverse some of its earlier excesses. The law was passed
after long and tortured debate within the Iraqi Parliament in which many Shi’ite leaders made it clear that
they were content with a political system that marginalized the Sunni Arab community, which they noted
was only 20 percent of the Iraqi population. An earlier
effort along the lines of the 2008 act has been derailed
by Shi’ite opposition, including statements made by
Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the three other most senior Grand Ayatollahs in Iraq.115
The 2008 law was enacted to respond to one of
18 benchmarks set by the U.S. Government to measure political reconciliation in Iraq. Moreover, U.S.
observers often viewed it as a particularly important
benchmark since it dealt with an effort to heal the
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Shi’ite-Sunni divide that was poisoning Iraqi politics
and undermining national reconciliation. The Iraq
Parliament was correspondingly under tremendous
pressure to produce some sort of a restructured and
reformed de-Ba’athification law. It was also supposed
to be designed to convey the message that there was
now a place for the Sunni Arab elite in helping to govern Iraq. Many Ba’athists who were purged from their
former positions were told that they could apply for
pensions and even reinstatement in their jobs as a result of this law.
There were nevertheless problems with the new
law. Many Sunnis did not view the law as liberal reform. Rather, they charged that the obtuse and ambiguous language of the law could be used to conduct further purges of ex-Ba’athists and fire soldiers
and state bureaucrats who were then employed by
the government. More dramatically, some former
Ba’athists claimed that the law was a ploy to lure them
into situations in which they could be killed.116 Those
Ba’athists in exile outside of the country have been
particularly suspicious. Others assume that there is
no future for them in ministries dominated by Shi’ite
politicians and activists, even if their lives are not actually threatened by working there. The law therefore
did not bridge differences between the Sunni and
Shi’ite communities to the extent that U.S. observers
had hoped it would.
Under the 2008 law, the Parliament was to appoint a new board and a new staff for the restructured
commission. The individuals appointed to the board
were supposed to act under amended rules and take
a more reconciliationist approach to the issue of deBa’athification. Unfortunately, Parliament failed to
meet its obligations to make these changes at the time
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of this writing. This failure occurred through both procrastination and possibly because some Members of
Parliament were unprepared to approve a list of government appointments to the commission for fear that
a successful effort to address this issue could be politically beneficial to Prime Minister Maliki. Under these
circumstances, de-Ba’athification board chairman Ali
Faisal al-Lami (then released from detention) stated in
January 2010 that his board should continue to function as the new Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) until a new board was in place. This argument was not accepted by a number of critics, and
the organization continued to exist under an uncertain
legal status. Although Chalabi was no longer playing
a day–to-day role, it was widely believed throughout
Iraq that he continued to pull most of the strings.
THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF
DE-BA’ATHIFICATION IN IRAQ
A new crisis for Iraqi national unity arose on January 6, 2010, when the AJC under Chalabi and al-Lami
announced the disqualification of 511 candidates in
the March 7 parliamentary elections for supposed
Ba’athist connections. This was done under the old
quasi-legal commission’s board in a sloppy and hurried manner that introduced an earthquake into the
Iraqi political system. Fifty-nine of those identified for
disqualification were cases of mistaken identity where
individuals had names similar to those found on the
commission’s database. Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya Alliance suffered most under these initial rulings, with 72
of its candidates identified as disqualified. Most of the
individuals identified for disqualification were from
Sunni religious or secular parties, which were often
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supportive of Sunni Muslim political rights. Many
of the most powerful Shi’ite politicians, including
Muqtada al-Sadr, supported the ban. To his credit,
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani strongly denounced the
ban. Iraqi critics began referring to the election process
as the “Iranian form of election.” In Iran, a Council of
Guardians evaluates the credentials of each candidate
for parliament and makes a decision about their fitness
to hold office as a way to constrain democracy and
limit voter choice. Numerous international observers
question the legitimacy of these Iranian procedures.
American presidents and other political leaders have
often been among those most critical of such a vetting
process.
The commission’s decision to disqualify such a
large number of candidates in a highly opaque process
also threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the
election with Sunni voters. In response to complaints
about the commission’s actions, an appeals court initially ruled that these candidates could run for election
and clear up the issue of Ba’athist affiliation later. Under reportedly heavy pressure from Maliki, the court
then reversed itself on February 12, 2010, and disqualified 145 candidates.117 If these reports are true, the AJC
was enjoying political cover from the Prime Minister’s
office. Nevertheless, these candidates and some who
were disqualified earlier were quickly replaced on
their party slates so that their coalitions could continue to contest the elections with minimal disruptions.
The Iraqiya political coalition was particularly hardhit by these changes because of the disqualification of
two of its leading Sunni candidates, Salah al-Mutlaq
and Dhafir al-Ani. Mutlaq, who headed the National
Dialogue Front of the Iraqiya coalition, was replaced
by his brother on the national slate. Later, in December 2010, he became one of Iraq’s two vice presidents.
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As this process unfolded, the legal and ethical limbo of this entire approach to candidate disqualification was severely tainted by the fact that both Chalabi
and al-Lami were running for seats in Parliament, and
thereby may have hoped to benefit from the disqualification of rivals through the commission, which they
dominated. The senior U.S. military leadership in Iraq
was deeply disturbed by this process, and accused both
Chalabi and al-Lami of being under the sway of Iran,
whose leadership had a potential interest in a weak,
divided Iraq that could not rise to become a regional
power. In a public presentation at a Washington, DC,
event, General Raymond Odierno stated that the two
Iraqi politicians “are clearly influenced by Iran.”118 He
added that, “We have direct intelligence that tells us
that.”119 General Odierno’s comments seem to raise
the concern that Iran was using Chalabi as a tool to
undermine Iraqi national unity. Many Iraqi leaders
were more direct and strongly raised the possibility
that both Chalabi and al-Lami were implementing
Iraqi election procedures in coordination with Tehran
for their mutual benefit.
Ironically, Chalabi and al-Lami’s quasi-legal activities seem to have boosted Sunni Muslim turnout
and may have caused the two leaders to lose support
among Shi’ite voters. Al-Lami was not elected in the
2010 election, although Chalabi won a seat because of
his party’s inclusion within the Iraq National Alliance
coalition list. More generally, the 2010 election did not
lead to a clear outcome. Rather, strong competing political blocs emerged and were unable to put together
a coalition government for 9 months. Iraqiya won a
plurality of 91 seats in Parliament, but was unable to
put together a coalition government. Maliki’s State of
Law alliance, which won 89 seats, was eventually able
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to do so, but only by including around 40 followers of
radical anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
A few months prior to the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, the Maliki government seemed intent on
repeating previous mistakes by alienating Sunni Muslims. This time Maliki’s actions occurred in a political
environment where the United States had a decreasing
level of influence. In October 2011, Iraqi authorities arrested at least 240 individuals whom they identified as
former leading members of the Ba’ath Party or former
important members of Saddam Hussein’s army. The
charges seem to imply that the arrests involved a plot
by these individuals to seize power after U.S. forces
depart the country.120 Some Iraqis also appear to believe that the arrests may not have involved a specific
plot as much as a general feeling that these individuals
were a threat and that arresting them was a useful precaution. In defending his actions, Maliki stated that he
continued to be concerned about Ba’athist “coups and
conspiracies.”121 In a Washington Post opinion article
addressed to the American public, he also asserted
that, “I refute characterizations that the detentions
were a sectarian action based on political motives.”122
Nevertheless, Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya political bloc has
been harshly critical of the arrests and demanded the
release of “all detainees held on false charges.”123
Serious Sunni-Shi’ite differences began to escalate
further, 1 day after the completion of the U.S. military
withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. At this time,
Maliki moved against one of his most important Sunni
rivals by issuing an arrest warrant for Vice President
Tareq al-Hashemi for supporting terrorism by running a death squad. The Maliki government also arrested three of Hashemi’s bodyguards and charged
them with terrorism. More Sunni arrests on similar
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charges were expected. In describing the Prime Minister’s actions, Iyad Allawi stated, “It reminds me personally of what Saddam Hussein used to do, where
he would accuse his political opponents of being terrorists and conspirators.”124 Hashemi emphatically
maintained his innocence, and many Sunnis assumed
that the charges were politically motivated. To avoid
arrest, Hashemi fled to Iraq’s Kurdish north where he
remained a guest of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.125
This move made it difficult for Maliki to arrest Hashemi since the Kurdish area has its own security forces
which are not controlled by the Iraqi Prime Minister.
While the Kurds and Sunni Arabs have not always
been particularly close, Kurdish sensitivities were
nevertheless raised by Maliki’s forceful effort to consolidate power. The legacy of the Saddam Hussein
regime has led many Kurds to fear a strong central
government in Baghdad.
During this time frame, Maliki also sought the removal by Parliament of Deputy Prime Minister Saleh
al-Mutlak of the Iraqiya bloc in response to his bitter criticism of the Prime Minister and his policies.
Although serving as deputy prime minister, Mutlak
had earlier been barred from standing in the March
2010 elections by the Accountability and Justice Commission.126 In December 2011, he stated, “Maliki is
worse than Saddam Hussein, because the latter was
a builder, but Maliki has done absolutely nothing.”127
Additionally, while Maliki moved harshly and effectively against Sunni leaders, his government remained deeply forgiving of Shi’ite groups that had a
clear history of terrorism. A variety of Shi’ite leaders
are known to maintain their own militias and to have
been involved with death squads and sectarian assassination. Muqtada al-Sadr serves as a particularly
compelling example.
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The increasing Sunni-Shi’ite differences within
Iraq also paralleled the reemergence of al-Qaeda in
many parts of the country. According to an August
2011 statement by Iraqi Lieutenant General Hussein
Ali Kamal, Iraq’s Deputy Interior Minister for Intelligence, “There was a thought that al-Qaeda had ended
in Iraq. No, they regrouped and now the third generation of al-Qaeda is working actively to reorganize
itself with weapons and training.”128 These words are
difficult, if not impossible, to dispute. Terrorist bombings continue throughout the country, some of them
with spectacular coordination and large numbers of
casualties. Pilgrims visiting Shi’ite religious sites are
a favored target. The government has responded to
these outrages with considerable brutality against
suspected Sunni terrorists to avoid charges of incompetence.
Iraq is now in a position where it will have to manage its sectarian differences without U.S. forces in
that country. While the United States initiated the deBa’athification campaign, the Iraqi leadership twisted
these policies into instruments of sectarian revenge,
which its Shi’ite-dominated government is never quite
willing to give up. This legacy will have to be borne by
Iraqis in the absence of U.S. troops who attempted to
contain sectarian differences in that country for almost
9 years. Both Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’ites (although not
Kurds) celebrated that final departure of U.S. combat
troops from their country, but such celebrations were
held separately. Iraq will either manage its sectarian
problems, or it will fail to do so. This is the choice that
awaits Iraqis and will have to be faced at some point
except in the event of a permanent U.S. military occupation, which is unacceptable to both countries. Any
actions against the Sunnis that appear to be war crimes
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have infinite potential to make the situation in Iraq
much worse. Iran already has a major role inside Iraq,
and the Sunni Arab nations are unlikely to allow this
influence to go uncontested. No Sunni nation wanted
to supply arms to Iraqi insurgents and then find that
American soldiers had been killed with weapons that
could be traced to them. Now, in the absence of U.S.
forces (except contractors), the rules have changed.
EVALUATION OF THE IRAQI
DE-BA’ATHIFICATION PROGRAM
The de-Ba’athification program as it was practiced
in Iraq is widely understood to have been deeply
flawed in both its original conception and in the way
that it was carried out. It seriously complicated all
of the major challenges that the United States and
its allies within Iraq faced after the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime. These problems included the
alienation of Sunni Arabs, the politicization of sectarian differences, and the rise of the Sunni insurgency.
De-Ba’athification also helped to cause a number of
Sunni Arab populations in neighboring countries to
become more virulently opposed to the U.S. presence
in Iraq, helping to undermine the U.S. presence in the
Middle East and create difficulties for pro-American
governments throughout the Arab World. A less dramatic approach to restructuring the Iraqi government
would have substantially reduced these problems,
but it would also have been seen as rendering it less
likely that the United States could completely change
the character of the Iraqi nation to be a close and reliable ally. Many Bush administration leaders believed
that such a transformation was possible and that a
new Iraq would favor permanent U.S. bases, seek U.S.
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investment, support cheap oil sales, and work with
U.S. allies. The decisions that were made with the idea
of maximizing these goals nevertheless did very little
to advance them, while instead aggravating massive
problems with security and stability. A key failure
here may be a lack of understanding about the limits
of what can be accomplished in the aftermath of extraregional coercive regime change in countries that are
disinclined to accept foreign tutors for very long.
U.S. decisionmakers did not want to allow Ba’athist
values to continue in Iraq, nor did U.S. leaders wish to
allow any kind of a reformed Ba’ath to be used as a
vehicle to oppose the U.S. presence and agenda in Iraq
through participation in the government and administration of the country. This approach may have been
aggravated by the embarrassing failure to find an Iraqi
nuclear weapons program or even residual chemical
and biological weapons programs. The administration, by every indication, believed such weapons existed prior to the war and, in their absence, needed to
justify the intervention in other ways. The emergence
of a disarmed Iraq in which some Ba’athists were still
present in the government was probably not something they would view as acceptable within these parameters. Nor was a new Iraq with a traditional Arab
foreign policy of opposing the West and Israel seen
as a particularly compelling result for U.S. casualties
and the financial cost of the war. The new Iraq was
expected to look a lot more like America, or at least
Turkey, than the Arab World.129
The worst U.S. decision made in Iraq during this
time frame was not, however, a single choice. Rather,
it was a combination of two decisions that reflected
the desire of the United States to destroy real and
imagined vestiges of the old regime at any cost. The
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decision by the CPA to engage in comprehensive deBa’athification and dissolve the Army simultaneously
created the building blocks of the insurgency and provided it with the organizational capacity to create that
insurgency. As noted, the Ba’ath Party did not control
the military primarily through propagandizing the
senior officers. Instead, it used a system of political
officers and counterintelligence officers throughout
the military as a way of bending the military to the
regime’s will. While still on balance an unwise policy,
deep de-Ba’athification would seem to have precluded the need for the even worse decision of disestablishing the military. This one major advantage of deep
de-Ba’athification was squandered when the second
CPA order was issued. As the increasingly harsh U.S.
approach unfolded, people treated like enemies correspondingly became enemies.
Attempting to understand Saddam Hussein’s rule
by assuming that he was a committed Ba’athist seeking to live up to Aflaq’s ideals was also a serious mistake. Modern totalitarian regimes never rule in the
name of naked power. They have an ideological cloak
that is meant to mask the centrality of a terror state.
Iraq under Saddam had a parliament, but parliamentary power was known to be a fraud. No one could
have seriously held Iraq’s Parliament responsible for
Saddam’s crimes. In the same way, the principles of
Ba’athism are not necessarily offensive to all anti-Saddam Iraqis or Arabs more generally. Saddam did not
build a criminal regime to serve Ba’athism. He built a
Ba’athist infrastructure to support a criminal regime.
The United States was correct to outlaw the Iraqi
Ba’ath Party due to its hijacking by a criminal regime,
but there also should have been a much greater willingness to tolerate individual noncriminal Ba’athists
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even if they did believe in Arab nationalism, secularism, and Arab modernization.
It might also be noted that Ba’athism is not widely viewed as the wave of the future in Middle East
politics. Angry young men are seldom inspired by it,
and are much more likely to join radical Islamist organizations if they seek to confront the West. In their
struggle with the Israelis, Palestinian radicals are now
much more likely to turn to the Islamist organization
Hamas than they are to work with Fatah, the mostly
secular former torchbearer of the Palestinian cause.
A few Palestinians even consider Hamas and Islamic
Jihad to be too tame and are seeking to affiliate with
al-Qaeda-like organizations.130 Some vigilance against
the virulent alternatives to Ba’athism might have been
considered. The simplistic belief that the Ba’athists
were all Nazis and most other Iraqis were waiting
for a Chalabi-like figure to lead them into a secular,
pro-Western government created a situation in which
many of the best options and opportunities for the
United States were squandered.
Retrospectively, it might be noted that the problems identified with de-Ba’athificaiton in Iraq do not
clearly suggest a need for changes in the structures of
the military organizations involved in the war or in
the ways in which they interface with civilian leaders.
Many military officers were working well with former Ba’athists and saw clearly the disadvantages of
a deep de-Ba’athification program. General Petraeus
was doing especially well in the Mosul area in the immediate post-war time frame by implementing generous peace terms, which he eventually had to revise
and make more punitive in response to orders from
higher authorities. ORHA Director Garner, General
Abizaid, and the senior CIA representative in Gar-
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ner’s staff were horrified by the implications of deep
de-Ba’athification but were unable to argue against it
effectively. The practical concerns of officers and intelligence professionals on the ground seem to have
been overruled by civilian leaders who felt that the
invasion of Iraq offered a historic opportunity to remake the Middle East in ways that benefited both the
United States and the region. Once civilian authorities,
including the President, had embraced this vision, the
military did its best to achieve favorable results within
the parameters set by civilian leaders. All leaders involved in the effort desperately wanted Iraq to be successful, but ultimately the de-Ba’athification policies
proved counterproductive to achieving that goal.
PARALLELS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
IRAQ AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
NATIONS
As noted throughout this work, some U.S. politicians feared a Saddamist restoration in Iraq to
the point that they supported a policy of deep deBa’athification, which became a major and ongoing
problem in Iraqi nation-building. Such logic was
based on the Ba’ath Party’s conspiratorial history and
its past ability to infiltrate government and military
institutions and then use them to infiltrate the government. The threat was especially serious to Bush
administration leaders, since the Ba’athists in Iraq
were ousted by a foreign military campaign and not
a popular uprising. Consequently, the United States
was placed in the position of attempting to manage
what constitutional scholar Andrew Arato called, “an
externally imposed revolution.”131 These U.S. policymakers believed that they had to build a radical new
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kind of political system in Iraq while remaining uncertain about the level of Iraqi public support for such an
enterprise, which could appear to Iraqis as a foreign
project designed to serve U.S. and perhaps even Israeli interests. This situation inclined some civilian U.S.
leaders at the Defense Department and CPA to push
for the deep de-Ba’athification that was so damaging
to Iraq’s national unity, causing many Sunni Muslims
to believe that they were facing an externally imposed
revolution that was directed primarily against them.
In the Arab Spring countries, few seem to believe that
regimes based on the old values and elites are likely
to reestablish themselves, although equally dismal regimes could still emerge in these societies and regime
“remnants” can still create difficulties. The political
edge that the Arab Spring countries have is that they
do not appear to have the same level of fear about the
old regimes reemerging as the Bush administration
leaders did about Iraq. This difference may reflect the
contrast between an imposed revolution and an indigenous one.
Many Arabs involved in the 2011-12 revolutionary
wave consider post-invasion Iraq to be an example of
what can go wrong following the fall of a long-standing
dictator. Some Arab revolutionary activists are correspondingly seeking to learn from the Iraqi experience
despite the very different circumstances under which
Saddam and the other Arab dictators were ousted.
While many within the Arab World tended to blame
the United States for all of the problems associated
with de-Ba’athification, this monograph has shown
that many of the worst excesses resulted from Iraqi
government policies undertaken long after responsible U.S. leaders had become concerned about such
activities and attempted to moderate them. The horror
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of Iraq in 2005-06 reminds the world of the capacity
of some human beings to slaughter people who lived
quietly for decades as their neighbors once the restraints of a crushing dictatorship have been removed.
Revolutions by their nature are illegal, and questions
of law and authority are often thrown open in eras of
revolutionary transformation. The new governments
established in 2011 clearly wish to avoid such a phase
in their own revolutions, although many face equally
daunting challenges, including the dangers of new
kinds of dictatorship and civil war.
Like Iraq, some of these states, including Syria and
Libya, have no democratic tradition. Others, such as
Tunisia and Egypt, have had more open societies and
limited power-sharing among diverse elites at earlier
points in their history, although authoritarian traditions have tended to be much more prevalent, especially in recent years. Moreover, at least currently,
there are no leading opposition figures with the dignity, moral authority, and heroic status of a Nelson
Mandela or Vaclav Havel. Such individuals can use
their standing as towering historical figures to lead
an effort to build a tolerant and progressive society.
Weaker politicians face more serious obstacles, no
matter how well intentioned they might be.
The two countries where the lessons of deBa’athification may have the most relevance are probably Libya and Syria, should the regime in Syria be
overthrown by the revolutionaries currently struggling against it. Both of these countries have long histories of especially intense repression and no tradition
of democracy. This approach contrasts with many
of the Arab monarchies that are organized along the
lines of a patriarchal model. In these instances, the
monarch often feels the need to show that he cares
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about the population and is making strong efforts to
ensure their welfare. While such regimes are inherently undemocratic, they are often much less brutal
than the governments of nonmonarchical dictators.
Social mobilization regimes, by contrast, are much
more inclined to demand the society grant its full support to the self-anointed guiding leader. Monarchs
have obligations to their citizens that they usually
freely acknowledge. The recently deposed dictators in
Iraq and Libya needed only to implement their vision
for society as they defined it, while maintaining solid
control over the instruments of repression. Ba’athism
in Iraq was what Saddam said it was, while Libya was
supposed to be guided by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s incoherent, “Third Universal Theory.”132 Syria is
organized along similar lines as Iraq with its form of
Ba’athism used to legitimize rather than guide actions
undertaken by the regime. Citizens in such systems
have obligations to the government, but they have no
right to question the leadership or the leader’s vision
in any public way. The Qadhafi and Assad political
systems made only cosmetic concessions to more liberal or tolerant societies. 133 Nevertheless, it remains
appropriate to begin the discussion of the lessons of
de-Ba’athification and the Arab Spring with the two
countries where the Arab Spring began, Tunisia and
Egypt. These were the first and easiest of the 2011
Arab revolutions.
Tunisia and Egypt.
The first two Arab Spring dictators overthrown in
2011 were President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and then President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.
While parallels between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and
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these countries exist, differences vastly outnumber
similarities. The Tunisian and Egyptian regimes were
clearly dictatorships, but they were also dramatically
less repressive than that of Saddam Hussein. Torture
and violence were used against dissidents in both
countries, but systematic, crushing repression on the
scale of the Iraqi regime was absent. Additionally,
there was not a clear ethnic-sectarian dimension to either of these regimes, as there was in Iraq, where a minority Sunni-led Arab regime brutally oppressed the
large and important Kurdish and Shi’ite elements of
the population, although no Sunni was ever immune
from government repression either. Under normal circumstances, the interest in revenge should be milder
in Tunisia and Egypt than in Iraq, and there should
be no calls to oppress one element of the population
on a sectarian basis as a part of that revenge. In this
regard, the occasional, but harsh brutality including
murder that has been unleashed against Egyptian
Coptic Christians has not been the result of antiMubarak anger, but rather the expression of religious
prejudices that a weak caretaker government has been
unwilling or unable to contain fully. Thus, violent Islamic extremists seem to have taken advantage of a
more permissive environment for the abuse of Coptic Christians.134 In this instance, the Iraqi example is
quite disturbing, since Iraq’s Christian community
was persecuted and shattered by newly empowered
Islamists after Saddam was ousted in 2003.135
In Egypt and Tunisia, the militaries of both countries remained intact during the revolutionary process
and continued to play a significant post-war role. In
both countries, the military made an early decision not
to support a crumbling dictatorship and to instead side
with demonstrators; the military, therefore, avoided
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going down with the old regime. The Tunisian Army
set the example by refusing to fire on anti-government
demonstrators.136 This behavior contrasted with that of
the Tunisian police who were more deeply complicit
with the 23-year dictatorship of the Ben Ali regime.137
The Egyptian Army also emerged from its country’s
revolution completely intact, having quickly refused
to back President Mubarak’s efforts to retain power
and being particularly unwilling to strike against the
civilian population. The rapid decision by the Egyptian military leadership to support the demonstrators
may have been facilitated by their strong aversion to
the idea of serving under President Hosni Mubarak’s
son, Gamal, if he succeeded his father (as was widely
expected). Gamal Mubarak had no military service,
traveled in circles of extreme crony capitalist wealth,
and was widely viewed as likely to rise to power without much merit through the backing of his father. Even
those generals who were not adverse to a new strongman, seldom liked the idea of a “ruling family” or “republican monarchy.”138 Consequently, to the Egyptian
military, the uprising was an important opportunity
to avoid eventual subordination to Mubarak’s widely
disliked son. This coincidence of interest among opposition groups and the military allowed the regime
to be deposed after only 18 days of unrest, but this victory only temporarily suppressed the profound differences between the military and the civilian opposition.
Currently, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF), which established a caretaker government after Mubarak was ousted, is viewed with considerable
distrust by many revolutionaries, political parties, and
particularly the Islamists.
There was no equivalent to de-Ba’athification
in either Tunisia or Egypt, although both states had
dominant parties that functioned primarily to support
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the dictator. Tunisia’s ruling party, the Constitutional
Democratic Rally (RCD) Party, was forced from power
in February 2011, not long after Ben Ali fell. The RCD
had served as Tunisia’s ruling party since that country
achieved independence in 1956, and was often viewed
as a path of political advancement. Party leaders attempted to save the organization and their own power
base after Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia by formally expelling him and his closest associates from the RCD.139
This act had no practical effect and was largely viewed
as a desperate public relations stunt. Some senior politicians also quit the party during this time frame in
an effort to remain in office, although these machinations usually did not save their positions. The RCD
was formally dissolved in March 2011 by the post-Ben
Ali leadership, and its funds were impounded. Concurrently, a number of senior party officials were arrested but always on specific charges, usually related
to corruption.140 Other government and party leaders
fled into exile to avoid trial. This orderly and respectable approach to the old regime is not surprising. In
January 2011, Dr. Moncef Marzouki, one of Tunisia’s
leading dissidents, who was soon to become the first
post Ben-Ali president, commented on the RCD by
stating, “We don’t want any revenge, but we are fast
with our principles that this horrible party does not
return.”141 A variety of other Tunisian revolutionaries
echoed these statements, while explicitly maintaining
that they did not want to repeat the mistakes of Iraqi
de-Ba’athification.142 Their focus remained arresting
those at the top of the regime, although Saudi Arabia ignored repeated requests to extradite the former
Tunisian dictator. Around 40 other senior leaders are
currently being prosecuted for the killing and wounding of anti-Ben Ali protestors.143
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On October 23, 2011, competitive elections were
held in Tunisia for a 217-member National Assembly
to draft a new constitution. The newly legalized Ennada Party won 41 percent of the total votes, translating into 91 seats within the National Assembly.144
This party is usually viewed as moderately Islamist,
although some Tunisian secularists and others fear it
could become more dogmatic if it is able to obtain and
consolidate power.145 Much of the support for Ennada
appears to have been a result of the organization’s unflinching opposition to the Ben Ali dictatorship, which
outlawed and persecuted it for a number of years.
Even some secular voters cast their ballots for this organization in the belief that an empowered Ennada is
the most likely way to ensure that former Ben Ali supporters never regain power. Additionally, during the
election campaign, Ennada strongly emphasized its
sterling record of confronting the previous regime.146
The challenge in Tunisian society now seems to be
between secular, European-oriented citizens and those
interested in a government more closely guided by
Islamic religious principles. There are parallels with
Iraq’s first competitive elections. Islamists did quite
well in those instances, although extremists such as
Muqtada al-Sadr are not as important in the Tunisian
system.147 As in Iraq, it appears that the defeat of a corrupt but secular dictatorship helped to open a serious
path for Islamist political victories in at least the short
term. Such victories are not inherently alarming unless the Islamists attempt to consolidate their power
and remain in office through undemocratic means.
Ennada’s current success is a result of a “backlash
election” in which its popularity directly mirrored the
unpopularity of the RCD. As that party involves itself in the more mundane aspects of governance, such
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popularity will probably fade. Additionally, other
parties can be expected to catch up with Ennada’s
superb campaign organization if the Tunisian system
remains democratic and the new constitution reflects
a basic fairness to all legal political organizations.
Egypt under Mubarak, like Tunisia, was officially
a multiparty system, but election laws were manipulated and outcomes rigged to ensure that members
of the President’s National Democratic Party (NDP)
dominated the Parliament. This party had around 3
million members in the days leading up to the revolution. In the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, the NDP
was abolished by an Egyptian court in April 2011. Its
property and funds were ordered to be turned over
to the Egyptian government, and its former members were prohibited from running for office in one
province. While these restrictions occurred only in
one province, the Egyptian judiciary did not tolerate
this curtailment of civil rights. The Supreme Administrative Court overturned the prohibitions preventing these individuals from running for office.148 This
approach should be understood to be fundamentally
different from de-Ba’athification, since all citizens are
invited to participate in political life in the new regime. Indeed, at the time of this writing, a plausible
candidate for the new presidency was Amr Moussa,
Mubarak’s popular one-time foreign minister, whose
international contacts may be useful in restoring desperately needed foreign investment for the Egyptian
economy. Additionally, some former NDP members
have now re-emerged as members of various minor
political parties such as the Freedom Party.149 Nevertheless, as new elites consolidate power, they could
turn more forcefully on former NDP members, and
calls for banning them from standing for elections
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continue and could intensify over time. Even this approach would nevertheless be significantly milder
than de-Ba’athification, which fired large numbers
of people from state bureaucracies as well as leading
politicians.
As in Tunisia, Islamists did exceptionally well in
Egypt’s first set of openly contested elections. The
Muslim Brotherhood’s newly established Freedom
and Justice Party won the most seats of any political
party, while the more hardline Islamist Nour (light)
Party came in second in the elections for the lower
house of Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood’s impressive performance is not surprising. Even while
illegal, this organization had been deeply involved in
charitable activities, including, in particular, providing support for the poor. The Mubarak government
tolerated the Brotherhood’s charitable role because
it had no interest in diverting its own resources to
address the problems of the poor. This background
strongly parallels that of the Sadr Movement in Iraq
both before and after the U.S.-led invasion. Moreover,
although tolerated, the Muslim Brotherhood was illegal, and its leadership was sometimes subject to arrest
and persecution.
This Islamist electoral success may pave the way
for these organizations to take power, although this is
not fully certain. The SCAF is still playing a significant
potential role, and presidential elections may still produce a strong secular leader. Additionally, even if the
Islamists are able to dominate Egyptian political institutions, they will almost certainly have to behave in a
way that does not isolate Cairo from important U.S.
and European sources of foreign aid, international
investment, and tourism income. Any new Egyptian
government that presides over an economic down-
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ward spiral, let alone a freefall, cannot be expected
to last for very long. The Muslim Brotherhood seems
to understand this situation and has already asserted
that they will not renounce Egypt’s peace treaty with
Israel.150 The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood
has also indicated that it is interested in working with
secular parties.
The Egyptian Revolution therefore seems to be less
comprehensive in reordering society than the process
that occurred in Iraq due to the U.S.-led invasion.
While the NDP has been outlawed, the SCAF remains
dominated by colleagues and decades-long friends of
President Mubarak. Moreover, during the Mubarak
regime, the military was repeatedly scrutinized to
make certain that Islamists did not infiltrate its ranks.
The result of this process is a senior leadership that
is deeply wary of the Muslim Brotherhood and other
Islamists, such as the Salafis associated with the Nour
Party. Egyptian politics correspondingly seems to be
increasingly dominated by the conflict between the
military leadership and the emerging Islamists with
a declining economy serving as the domestic context.
Secular parties are also a player in this struggle, although their influence is limited by failures in competitive elections with the Islamists. As this struggle
continues, the military seems focused on maintaining
its role as a powerful autonomous actor in the Egyptian political system, including control over significant economic resources that are unrelated to military
functions. Under such a scenario, the military role
will remain similar to its situation under Mubarak.
Moreover, state television and print media tend to
portray SCAF leader Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi
in the same fawning light as they applied to President
Mubarak during his years in power, providing some-
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thing of an echo of the earlier regime.151 Conversely, in
a key difference, the nonstate media can be extremely
critical of the military’s actions as was seen during the
February 2012 soccer riots.
Libya.
There are a number of differences between the Iraqi
and Libyan situation, but events in Iraq do have limited parallels to Libya, because the legacy of long and
brutal dictatorships in both countries. Fortunately, a
number of Libyans appear to see Iraq as a cautionary
tale for them.152 At least some Libyans view the near
civil war in Iraq as a result of a cycle of revenge and
backlash between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ite communities, which carries important lessons for them. Although Libya is not factionalized along sectarian lines
such as those in Iraq, there are important regional,
tribal, and some ethnic differences. Responsible Libyans are consequently concerned about maintaining
national unity and avoiding internal armed conflict.
They are also aware of how quickly national unity can
break down following the ouster of a brutal dictator.
More ominously, building a unified and functioning
society in Libya will be significantly more challenging than rebuilding Tunisia or Egypt, since both of the
earlier revolutions were much less violent, and both
of these countries retained a functioning political, economic, and institutional infrastructure that survived
the dictatorships. In the aftermath of Qadhafi’s defeat
and death, it is not even fully clear that Libya will be
able to maintain itself as one nation. Libya only became a unified nation under its first and only king
in the 1950s, after having been liberated from Italian
fascism. The major regions are Cyrenaica in the east,

71

Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan in the southern
part of the country. Political integration of these regions occurred to some extent under the monarchy,
but not under the Qadhafi regime, which sought to
take advantage of regional disagreements.
Libya had no political parties under the Qadhafi
regime, and there was no direct equivalent to the
Ba’ath Party. There was, however, the Revolutionary
Committees Movement set up by the regime to create
vehicles for pro-regime activism. Like the Iraqi Ba’ath
Party, these organizations are sometimes identified
as important components of government, although
real power has always resided with the dictator, his
family, and his closest associates. Such organizations
were nevertheless charged with a role in “defending the revolution,” and were often used as a tool of
political and ideological surveillance as well as key
enablers of corruption. Under these circumstances,
the National Transitional Council (NTC) decision to
abolish these organizations appears wise and gives up
very little administrative talent, unlike the process of
de-Ba’athification. While Qadhafi was probably just as
ruthless as Saddam Hussein, his regime was nowhere
near as well-organized for repression as Iraq.153 Many
individuals associated with these groups have a lot to
answer for, including human rights abuse and torture.
The questions that remain are; how to establish a clear
dividing line between the worst offenders and the others, as well as how to ensure that justice is dispensed
on an individual basis and does not expand into collective punishment. The Iraq example indicates the
vital role of fair judicial institutions rather than highly
political commissions for such tasks. As noted earlier in this work, Ambassador Bremer has openly acknowledged his mistake in not engaging the judiciary
on these kinds of issues.
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Future armed conflict in Libya could occur among
squabbling victors or between the new government
and former supporters of the old regime, including
traditionally pro-Qadhafi tribes, cities, and regions.
As in Iraq, long-established rivalries and feuds are beginning to re-emerge as a side effect of the collapse of
the old regime’s repressive apparatus. The new Libyan leadership is aware of this problem, but has only
limited tools for preventing or containing it. Building
new institutions and agreeing upon the rules to prevent and regulate post-Qadhafi conflict will not be a
simple or minor set of tasks. One positive factor is that
during the fighting, the anti-Qadhafi leadership of the
NTC was deeply concerned about maintaining international support for the anti-Qadhafi struggle, and this
attitude may extend into the post-war period when
the new government is seeking international support
for trade and economic development. Since the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime, a variety of Libyan leaders have indicated their concern that ongoing conflict
or large-scale acts of revenge would create problems
for international backers and potential international
investors in post-Qadhafi Libya. Unfortunately, there
are a variety of incentives to seek revenge. Libyan
sources maintain that around 30,000 Libyans were
killed in the course of the revolution to overthrow the
Qadhafi regime.154 Such numbers are not inconceivable for the long months of bitter struggle.
A key problem is that the new government has
only limited control over the erratically-trained militia forces that are nominally subordinate to them.
In order to build a system based on law and order,
something will have to be done to either professionalize or disarm militia forces. This is expected to remain
a long-term problem, since many of these forces view
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maintaining their arms as an important way to ensure
that they are not losers in establishing a new order.
Many also believe that they have an essential role in
providing local security against criminals and rivals.
On a few occasions since Qadhafi’s death, fighting has
broken out between rival militias.155 Establishing the
rule of law will be an especially difficult challenge in
Libya, where a number of different militias report to
different commanders, and arrests often seem to be
arbitrary.
Rebuilding a modern professional Libyan military
force is therefore a serious challenge. During the dictatorship, the military was deliberately kept weak because of Qadhafi’s fear that a new coup could emerge
from their ranks. Such fears were well-founded. There
have also been repeated reports of serious coup and
assassination attempts against Qadhafi from the ranks
of the military in the years prior to the revolution.
More dramatically, a large-scale army mutiny took
place in October 1993, with up to 2,000 troops participating in the effort to overthrow the dictator.156 The
center of the uprising was the city of Misurata where
local troops nominally under government authority
were not trusted to quash the uprising. The Air Force
was therefore used to bomb the rebels until they surrendered. This incident did not end military discontent with the regime, and coup attempts in 1996-97
may also have involved military coordination with
Qadhafi’s Islamist enemies.157 Qadhafi attempted to
address the danger of a rebellious military by creating special army brigades under the authority of his
sons, Khamis and Moatassim. Khamis’ 32nd Brigade
was responsible for the dictator’s personal security
and was considered his most loyal unit. Each of these
units nevertheless fragmented badly in the last part of
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the 2011 civil war and experienced a number of desertions.158
Most of the prisoners from the pro-Qadhafi units,
such as the Khamis Brigade, now claim that they never fired their weapons, they joined only for the money, and they were not involved in torture. Nevertheless, pro-Qadhafi troops did commit a variety of war
crimes throughout the conflict. Before the imposition
of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NoFly Zone over Libya, Qadhafi ordered the Libyan Air
Force to bomb urban areas in the hands of the uprising. Most pilots involved in the conflict followed these
orders, although a few defected to Malta or Italy. A
willingness to refuse unlawful orders was therefore
the exception and not the rule. Another particularly
ghastly set of crimes against civilians involved the regime siege of Misurata, Libya’s third largest city. This
siege involved regime efforts to retake the city thorough a variety of means, including the use of artillery
and multiple rocket launchers to fire indiscriminately
into civilian areas. These attacks included the use of
cluster munitions against the civil population. Orders
for such tactics are almost certain to have come from
the regime’s leadership. Other war crimes, including the massacre of prisoners and the use of rape as
a weapon of war, have also been charged, although it
is not clear where the orders for these atrocities actually originated. It therefore seems likely that many of
Libya’s citizens will seek justice in the aftermath of the
conflict.
It is, of course, known that some anti-regime
forces committed war crimes as well, but these appear to have occurred at the small unit level and were
not part of any overall National Transitional Council
(NTC) strategy. Senior NTC figures did not order war
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crimes, and, because of their limited control over the
militias, probably had no real ability to halt excesses
at the tactical level. Such excesses were serious but
appear more limited compared to the actions of the
regime, where a furious Qadhafi seemed willing to
do just about anything to crush the people he called
“rats.” Libyan authorities are unlikely to pursue excesses by their own militia troops at this time due to
an urgent concern to limit future fissures within the
ranks of the revolutionary movement. At this time, it
may be more important for them to begin to professionalize the individuals who are expected to remain
in the new Libyan Army so that they behave with
restraint and military discipline in the face of future
challenges and particularly domestic unrest that may
continue to plague Libya. Some crimes committed on
the rebel side may nevertheless be too serious to overlook indefinitely, and it may be less divisive to address
them rather than ignore them. The unsolved murder
of NTC General Abdul Fatah Younes on July 28, 2011,
may be an example of such a crime. This assassination
is widely believed to have been a result of internal differences in the anti-Qadhafi forces, possible because
of Younes’ background as a former Qadhafi interior
minister.159
In addition to former soldiers, there are questions
of the future of pro-Qadhafi tribesmen in the new Libya. Libya is a highly tribalized society with around 140
tribes and clans, of which 20 to 30 are considered large
and important. Qadhafi’s own tribe, the Qadadfa, is
sufficiently small and weak, that the dictator had no
choice except to reach out to individuals from other
tribal units to help establish a base of power. Unsurprisingly, members of pro-Qadhafi tribes (such as the
Magarha) have dominated the Qadhafi regime’s secu-
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rity forces, and it may be difficult to fully disentangle
individual actions from those encouraged and abetted
by tribal leaders and authority figures. This situation
could invite the prospect of collective punishment
from a vindictive successor regime. Some of the most
important tribes, such as the Werfella, had combatants
on both sides of the struggle to overthrow Qadhafi.
This situation helps to mitigate the danger of collective punishment to some extent.
Beyond the dangers of unrestrained revenge, many
of the new Libyan leaders are also concerned about
the potential problems of building a new government
with effective and legitimate institutions. Colonel Qadhafi had some unusual ideas about government, and
his divisive and bizarre approaches to governance left
little foundation on which to build. Qadhafi was openly contemptuous of political institutions and claimed
to have developed a new form of government based
on revolutionary democracy expressed at the grassroots level. As seen with a variety of oil-rich countries,
Colonel Qadhafi organized a strong public sector in
Libya which he used to increase popular dependency
on the government and to support claims of limited
unemployment.
While the Libyan government has a number of serious problems, there are also some positive factors
for the country’s future. One of the most important
of these factors is the country’s economic potential.
Like Iraq, Libya is an important oil-producing state,
but it also has only about a fifth of the Iraqi population. Moreover, it now appears that Qadhafi diverted
huge sums of money to various secret bank accounts
and investments, which are now available to the
current Libyan leadership. One estimate suggests
that there may be as much as $200 billion in such ac-
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counts.160 While economic potential did not save Iraq
from large-scale sectarian conflict, the possibility of a
dramatically higher standard of living for virtually all
Libyans would seem to be a positive factor in addressing problems such as youth unemployment, which
can increase the potential for unrest. The experience
of both Iraqi de-Ba’athification and the disbanding of
the Iraqi Army illustrated the severe dangers of spikes
in youth unemployment in post-revolutionary systems. The Iraq experience suggests that the sooner the
government is able to use its considerable resources to
create reconstruction jobs, the safer Libya will be from
a downward spiral into instability.
Syria.
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the ouster of the Syrian regime may take years of struggle, if it occurs at
all. At the time of this writing, more than 5,500 Syrian
civilians had been killed by the military and security
forces as part of this conflict, and the rate of civilian
deaths may yet increase rather than decline. Syria is
ruled by a Ba’athist dictatorship, which has a number
of similarities with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Current
President Bashar al-Assad rose to become the leader
of Syria in 2000 following the death of his father. Syria
is, for all practical purposes, a one-party state with its
own branch of the Ba’ath Party providing the ideological façade for a system of government designed
to protect the privileged position of those currently in
power.161 Syria, also like Iraq, is a patchwork of different sectarian groups, and Syria’s ongoing revolutionary struggle has profoundly sectarian overtones.
Since 1970, Syria has been led by presidents from the
Assad family, members of the Alawite sect, which is
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generally considered to be a branch of Shi’ite Islam.
The Alawites of Syria, at 10 percent of the population,
are a much smaller portion of the Syria’s total population than the Arab Sunnis of Iraq who comprise 20
percent of the population of their country. Most of the
most important members of the government, military,
and Ba’ath Party are from the Alawite sect or other
minority communities allied with the Alawites. Sunni
Muslims constitute around 70-75 percent of the population, whereas Christian and other minorities comprise the remaining portion.
Throughout much of Syrian history, Alawites
were an ill-treated, impoverished religious minority
who were seldom able to obtain anything more than
the worst employment that the society had to offer.
Their fortunes improved somewhat when opportunities to serve in the French colonial army became
available after France occupied Syria as a League of
Nation’s mandate following World War I. The legacy
of being near the bottom of Syria’s socioeconomic
ladder weighs heavily on many current members of
the Alawite community as they contemplate their future under either a Sunni-dominated democracy or a
Sunni-led dictatorship. If post-Assad Syria was to be
dominated by Islamists, their views of the Alawites
could be even further poisoned by claims their sect is
heretical. Such beliefs are widespread among Sunni
Islamist hardliners. Additionally, many Alawites undoubtedly fear Sunni revenge for 40 years of brutality and misrule under the Assads. The bloody conflict that has raged over the last year has also added
horrendous new grievances to the already long list
of injustices for which the Alawites may be held accountable. Saudi writer Essam al-Zamel has acidly
summed up this situation with almost literal gallows
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humor by stating, “The greater the tyrant’s resistance
to his people, the worse his punishment. It seems that
Bashar [Assad] will be crucified to death in the center
of Damascus.”162
While many Alawite leaders and even ordinary
Alawite citizens fear that they will be punished should
the regime be deposed, they may not be alone in such
fears. Many non-Alawite minorities, especially the
large Christian community, are concerned that the Syrian revolution may create a Sunni-dominated Muslim
government that will severely curtail their rights.163
Unsurprisingly, many members of these groups show
some reluctance to support the anti-Assad uprising,
although they also fear that any highly visible support
for the government could cause them to experience
more problems in the aftermath of a successful revolution against Assad. Christians looking at the fate of
their co-religionists in post-Saddam Iraq cannot help
being disturbed about their potential fate in the aftermath of successful revolution. Additionally, the rapid
rise of Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt following the
ouster of the dictatorships raises concerns that a similar result may occur if there is a successful revolution
in Syria.
It has already been noted that the Arab Ba’ath
movement began in Syria and spread to Iraq from
there. In Syria, as in Saddam’ Hussein’s Iraq, the
Ba’ath Party is primarily a policy implementation tool
and an instrument for mobilizing the society to support the government. While the party is a bulwark of
the regime, it does not have much input to the president or other key decisionmakers. Real power is concentrated in the Assad inner circle and the top ranks of
the security forces, which are dominated by Alawites
with strong links to the Assad family. Interestingly,
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a significant number of lower-ranking Ba’ath Party
members resigned in protest from the organization at
the early stages of the uprising, indicating some disagreement within the party.164 It is likely that many of
these dissenting individuals are Sunni Muslims who
joined the party to improve their ability to obtain jobs,
money, and privileges. Their resignations appear to
have been only a minor inconvenience for the regime
as it shifted its strategy for controlling the uprising to
one dominated by force and brutality.
Throughout the over 40 years of the Assads’ defacto dynasty, the Syrian government has made an extraordinary effort to immunize the regime from coups
or uprisings. This approach has involved a relentless
effort to neutralize the Army’s capability to engage
in anti-regime action of any kind. Bashar’s younger
brother, Maher Assad, commands the Syrian Army’s
elite Republican Guard Division and the equally wellequipped Fourth Armored Division, both of which
are composed predominantly of Alawites and are
completely loyal to the regime.165 Non-elite units are
led by loyalist officers throughout their chain of command, and military personnel are monitored carefully
by the security services. The independence shown by
the Egyptian Army during the Tahrir Square demonstrations is unthinkable in Syria.
Assuming that they avoid summary execution in
the aftermath of being overthrown, Assad and his key
supporters will almost certainly be tried for mass murder, and they know this. With the possible exception
of Iran, there seems to be relatively few places where
they can flee. Additionally, Bashar understands that
his safety and that of his associates depends upon retaining an unreformed police state, which he views as
the only guarantee of Alawite privileges and safety.
Qadhafi is reported to have asked his executioners,
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“What did I ever do to you” in his last hour of life, apparently stunned at the depth of hatred against him.
Bashar is under no such illusions. He is aware of his
crimes and aware that only a strong dictatorship can
prevent him from sharing Qadhafi’s fate.
The Syrian regime will probably never be overthrown by nonviolent protesters, whom they are
willing to kill in whatever numbers they need to in
order to remain in power. Since these tactics are increasingly viewed as ineffective, the opposition seems
more willing to consider armed opposition. If Assad is
to be overthrown, this will have to be done by armed
struggle, and the effort to oust the dictator may well
continue to evolve into an increasingly bitter civil war.
The other side of this approach is that the Syrian regime will use armed opposition to justify increasing
its own level of repression, which is already at extremely high levels. All of these factors indicate that
the Syrian government will use all of the repression
of which it is capable rather than liberalize the regime
in a way that fundamentally threatens the power of
the current elites. Many reports cited by Western
news agencies have accused Syrian military units of
indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas thought to be
opposition strongholds.166 The use of such tactics was
later confirmed by Arab League monitors, whom the
Syrian regime accepted into their country to buy time
before its case was sent to the UN Security Council.
These monitors have now departed Syria.
The Syrian military has held together extremely
well throughout much of the uprising, although there
are increasing reports of defections.167 Some of these
defectors have fought against pro-regime units, but
they have neither the organizational infrastructure
nor the logistics and supply network necessary to
maintain themselves as a conventional military force.
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Various spokesmen for the defectors call these forces
the Free Syrian Army (FSA). While some units of the
FSA have been allowed to seek sanctuary on Turkish
soil, there is no indication that Ankara is involved in
any effort to arm, equip, or train these units.168 Moreover, at the time of this writing, FSA forces in Turkey
did not seem to comprise more than a few hundred
individuals. Nevertheless, as the carnage continues, it
is likely that Sunni conscripts will feel increasing psychological pressure to defect. The conscripts make up
the majority of forces in the non-elite military units.
In light of the above considerations, any program
of de-Ba’athification in Syria could be especially brutal
because of the ever-growing list of crimes the regime
has committed against the Syrian people to remain in
power. It has been noted that some Iraqis spoke of deBa’athification as de-Sunnization, and the prospect for
all Syrian Alawites to be viewed as regime supporters
suggests that de-Ba’athification in Syria would take
on a sectarian character as well. While most Alawites sympathize with the Assads, not all Alawites have
committed crimes to support them. The prospect of
a post-revolutionary Alawite bloodbath is therefore
something that all responsible friends of a new Syrian government would have to guard against. It is not,
however, clear that neighboring Arab governments
will push hard in that direction, since all of them, except Iraq, have Sunni leadership. Many Lebanese fear
that sectarian hatred in Syria could spill over into their
own country, but Lebanon has very little ability to
moderate actions within Syria. Perhaps the best hope
is that a post-revolutionary government will need a
great deal of aid for reconstruction and development,
and any anti-Alawite bloodbath would inevitably
cause the United States and Europe to suspend such
aid and call upon Arab states to do so as well.
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Yemen.
At this time, only one additional Arab leader has
been ousted as part of the Arab Spring upheavals, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. There are
probably relatively few lessons that Yemen can draw
from Iraq’s experience with de-Ba’athification. Yemen has never maintained a strong centralized government such as could be found in Iraq under Saddam. President Saleh ruled by political opportunism,
manipulation, and bribery as much as by repression.
One of Kuwait’s post-1991 foreign ministers once
characterized him as a dictator like Saddam Hussein,
but this is not true. Saleh never had the apparatus of
repression that Saddam maintained, and many of his
leading officers appear almost as opportunistic as the
former president. In situations such as this, Yemeni
officers have often had the political space to consider
their own interests in deciding if they will continue to
support Saleh.
Yemen is a multiparty system, and while former
President Saleh’s political party, the General Peoples
Congress, may not be abolished, it will almost certainly be weakened. The powerful Islamist party, Islah, is
its most likely successor. Such an ascendancy would
hardly be good news for the United States, which
had designated the Islah party leader as a terrorist
supporter. Nevertheless, no new leader in Yemen is
likely to establish a strong central government. The
powerful Yemeni tribes and the military will probably
continue to dominate the political system. General Ali
Moshen, a former Saleh lieutenant who defected to the
rebels along with the forces under his command, may
emerge as an especially important post-Saleh leader.
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Indeed, Saleh has largely viewed the entire process as
an effort by Moshen and his supporters to replace him.
CONCLUSION
The United States had a level of involvement in
the Iraq de-Ba’athification program in 2003 that will
not be duplicated in efforts to support contemporary
Iraq or to construct new political systems in the Arab
Spring states considered in this work. The United
States will therefore be in a position to grant advice
and support to friendly states, but it will not be able to
play a major role in organizing new political systems
as it once sought to do in Iraq. Yet, the experiences
with de-Ba’athification are probably too valuable
to be completely dismissed and provide a number
of important examples of the difficulties inherent in
establishing a post-dictatorial government. In everything it does regarding both contemporary Iraq and
the Arab Spring nations, Washington will therefore
have to draw from relevant experience, while remaining aware of its more limited influence. Such influence
must be used wisely. In Libya, this approach seems to
offer some promise. The U.S. decision to work behind
the scenes of the NATO intervention into Libya rather
than play a leading role has limited U.S. responsibility for the aftermath in that country. While the United
States provided essential support to the Libyan operation, the decision to play a limited role in the actual
fighting seems to have helped Washington avoid General Colin Powell’s famous, “you break it, you own
it,” pottery barn rule. This situation suggests that the
United States can offer advice and support when this
seems prudent, while remaining in the background in
other cases when that seems wise. Within these guide-
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lines, the following recommendations are offered for
addressing concerns about the future of Iraq and the
Arab Spring with the lessons of de-Ba’athification
as a consideration. Some of these recommendations
may also be relevant for non-Arab countries, including Iran, if their populations rise against oppressive
regimes in Arab Spring-type revolts. Regional experts
and policymakers might wish to consider such parallels on a case-by-case basis.
1. The United States must continue to do whatever it can to support a process of national conciliation in Iraq. In order to do this, U.S. leaders must remain attuned to problems in Iraq and elsewhere that
may push the country toward state failure. The Bush
administration often seemed to view democracy as a
wholly positive transformative system without fully
understanding the ways in which it can go wrong in
deeply polarized and sectarian societies. As noted,
these mistakes were eventually understood by many
U.S. leaders over time, but, by then, the dynamics of
sectarian conflict were especially difficult to contain
and roll back. The United States must nevertheless
continue to express its disapproval for politicized and
reckless de-Ba’athification procedures in Iraq. Washington must also stress that political institutions used
as instruments of sectarian oppression always hold
the potential to incite civil war in societies that have
not been totally crushed by their governments, one of
the worst outcomes imaginable.
2. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) of the U.S. Army must realize that they may
often have unique opportunities and unique credibility to offer advice on the lessons of Iraq, including the problem of de-Ba’athification, to their counterparts in some of the Arab Spring nations. The U.S.
Army has a long history of cooperating with some
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of the Arab Spring militaries and has a particularly
strong relationship with the Egyptian military. These
bonds of trust and teamwork can be used to convey
a variety of messages beyond exclusively military issues. Additionally, many U.S. Army officers gained a
great deal of experience in Iraq from which they can
draw upon to highlight the ways in which revolutionary change can go wrong.
3. The United States will have to use the lessons learned about Iraqi de-Ba’athification to assess
ways in which Arab Spring countries may be failing. U.S. leaders must also consider ways to advise
or otherwise help struggling governments. One of
Iraq’s key problems was the rapid development of the
view among some Iraqis that democracy is a winnertake-all form of government. The activities of the deBa’athification Commission often helped to reinforce
that view among both Shi’ites and Sunnis. All Arab
Spring governments will need to take care that new
post-authoritarian institutions do not reflect a similar
winner-take-all mentality among leaders, sects, tribes,
political groups, or regions. The United States can
draw upon its experiences in 2003 Iraq to make this
message known to new governments, but unlike Iraq,
the United States is not in a situation where it must
take ownership of the Arab Spring. This means that
U.S. leaders will have to have the dexterity to recognize when their advice is helpful and welcome and
when it may be a source of resentment and conflict.
4. The United States needs to help strengthen and
support judiciary institutions in the Arab Spring
countries and strongly emphasize the need to resolve issues of guilt or innocence within a judiciary
framework rather than a commission composed of
politicians or any similar organization. The United

87

States should laud any efforts in these countries to advance the concepts of rule of law and support the activities of UN specialized agencies and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to provide
aid to judicial bodies in the post-revolutionary states.
It has already been noted that Iraq’s de-Ba’athification
Commission was administered by politicians, and
that these politicians were running for office against
people who they disqualified for participation in the
election. In no part of the planet can this be considered
fair. Seeking to honestly establish the guilt of those accused of political crimes as well as their punishment
is best left to judges if a fair court system can be established and maintained. Eligibility for particular individuals to run for office should likewise be addressed
by unbiased judicial institutions.
5. The United States needs to be careful to avoid
the appearance of publicly picking out and then lobbying for favorite leaders in the new Arab Spring
governments, as it did with Ahmad Chalabi in Iraq.
If these countries are lucky, they may find a dignified
and fair-minded national leader, although it would
be a mistake for outside forces to attempt to generate
one. The U.S. experience with Chalabi in Iraq might
be particularly instructive here. U.S. leaders should
not underestimate the distrust that many Arab populations feel for the United States. U.S. support for a
leader with strong connections in Washington is not
always well received by a populist electorate. No nations are so close that their publics want another state
to choose their leadership for them. Additionally,
problems have already resulted when Qatar chose
to support some Libyan politicians and factions over
others in their aid programs. Qatar was the strongest
Arab backer of the Libyan revolution, and Doha has
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a lot more latitude to get away with this type of approach than does the United States. In spite of this
situation, there are already numerous complaints that
Qatar is interfering in Libyan internal affairs when it
does so.169
6. In Iraq, the United States learned that free elections produced a great deal of hope but also a variety of problems, and U.S. leaders must consider the
lessons of this experience as they formulate policy
involving the Arab Spring states. Competitive elections are clearly a positive development, but they do
not always indicate an increase in stability or tolerance within a society. It is therefore important that
elections are viewed as the beginning of a process of
democratization and not as the culmination of such a
process. Protection of minority rights and the importance of peaceful transitions of power from one elected
government to another are also key pillars.
7. The United States needs to indicate a willingness to work with Islamist governments so long as
those governments remain democratic, respect human rights, respect minority rights, and show some
level of cooperation on key regional problems such
as counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. In
Egypt, the United States needs to be willing to engage
the Muslim Brotherhood and communicate the need
for that organization to continue a variety of important Egyptian policies, including respect for democratic procedures, willingness to work with the military, and respect of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
The United States has a reputation with some Middle
Eastern citizens, including many Iraqis, of favoring
democracy only when regional democracy produces
pro-American candidates. A U.S. unwillingness to
judge any Egyptian government by its actions can
only feed that narrative, and U.S. leaders need to be
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open to the possibility of partnership with a democratic Muslim Brotherhood-led government. Conversely, any new Egyptian leadership should be made
aware of policy changes and red lines that might seriously disrupt normal relations. U.S. policymakers and
military officials dealing with foreign militaries will
have to remain nimble in making judgments about the
differences among Islamic groups and the degree to
which U.S. cooperation with new leaders is wise or
even possible.
8. The U.S. Army and other services also need to
work closely with the Egyptian military through a
variety of programs already in place, if this is at all
possible. The U.S. civilian and military leaderships
should do everything possible to resolve whatever
problems it might have with the Egyptian leadership,
while leaving such programs in place. Such an effort
must be based on an understanding that the military
exists to serve democracy and must avoid policies
that violate human rights. Nevertheless, another reason to cultivate the Egyptian military is that it is in a
key position to keep politicians honest. A military that
views itself as above politics will resist governmental
efforts to act in extra-constitutional ways and should
be particularly unwilling to serve as the repressive
arm of any government that seeks to retain power by
overriding democratic procedures. Any effort by the
Islamist parties to purge the military for political reasons is correspondingly a cause for serious concern.
9. The United States must be exceptionally wary
about involving itself in the Syrian revolution
against the Assad regime, in the full understanding
that Syria is just as complicated as Iraq and not every Middle Eastern problem has an American solution. It is not yet clear how the Syrian revolution will
play out, but it seems highly unlikely that NATO will
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adopt similar policies to those in Libya. The words of
journalist Michael Hirsh, “What happens in Libya,
stays in Libya,” correctly suggest that a unique set of
factors enabled international action against the Qadhafi regime, and that this set of factors is unlikely to
be duplicated elsewhere in the Arab World.170 Syria,
in contrast, would present a hornets’ nest of problems
comparable in intensity to those the United States encountered in Iraq. Even without foreign intervention,
it seems unlikely that the Assad regime will be able
to crush the opposition by force, which remains its
goal at this time. It also seems unlikely that the regime
will offer more than simply cosmetic efforts at powersharing. If the regime is overthrown, the United States
must seek to work with post-Assad revolutionaries,
but ultimately may be viewed with distrust in the
Arab World for any effort to involve itself in combat.
Like the Iraqis, the Syrians have enduring decades
of propaganda about U.S. conspiracies to control the
Middle East.
10. The U.S. leadership must also understand
that, to an even greater extent than the Iraqis, Syrian
citizens may be susceptible to anti-Western conspiracy theories and distrustful of U.S. intensions. The
close U.S. friendship with Israel is especially likely to
create Syrian distrust about any U.S. agenda for their
country. Despite some occasional Iraqi participation
in the conflict with Israel, including the 1973 ArabIsraeli War and the 1991 Scud missile strikes, Iraq is
usually a peripheral player in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
while Syria is at the core of the conflict. The Iraqis
viewed the U.S. presence in their country with steadily increasing criticism, with Washington receiving
very little credit as a liberator, due to a local belief that
the United States invaded their country to advance its
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own agenda for obtaining cheap oil and establishing
military bases that could be used to dominate the region. In Syria, suspicions of an alternative U.S. agenda
favorable to Israel could only be stronger. This situation is not an insurmountable problem, but it may also
indicate the need for the United States to allow other
friendly nations to play a major role in helping to resolve problems in Syria should Assad be overthrown.
11. The United States must maintain an ongoing dialogue with its closest regional allies, including Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, about the
changes that are occurring in the Arab World, and
Washington would do well to consider their views
in the formulation of policy. This type of behavior
was not always apparent in Iraq on the issue of deBa’athification when some allies such as Jordan and
Saudi Arabia considered the United States to be dismissive of their views in favor of its own poorly informed assumptions. These assumptions included the
belief described by Professor Fukiyama that the default position for a defeated dictatorship is always a
liberal democracy. The Jordanians and the Saudis had
been living in that region long enough to know better.
The Jordanians had even seen a branch of their own
ruling family ousted by a military coup in Iraq and
then watched a succession of new and more brutal
dictatorships emerge in that country culminating in
the rule of Saddam Hussein. While the United States
may ultimately disagree with these countries, their
views have earned serious consideration.
12. The United States must understand that the
rise of Islamists in the Arab Spring countries is not
an aberration and is likely to continue to occur in
additional cases, although it is uncertain that Islamists will dominate any of these countries in the
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long term so long as democratic institutions persist.
The U.S. leadership will need to understand that in
the aftermath of a dictatorship, those individuals and
organizations that the dictator most violently oppressed often emerge with vastly enhanced prestige.
In some cases, they may emerge as a new set of elites.
In many countries, these people will be Islamists. All
of the regimes that have been overthrown as part
of the Arab Spring were basically secular just as the
Saddam Hussein regime was predominantly secular,
although greater religious expression was allowed in
the regime’s last decade as a safety valve to relieve
popular misery and discontent. In Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya, Islamists poised the main opposition to the regimes and were consequently subjected to the greatest degree of repression. Unsurprisingly, in all of these
countries, the status of Islamists has been enhanced
by the degree of opposition that they presented to the
former regimes. Moreover, the Islamists, by virtue of
their years of opposition and persecution, are sometimes seen as presenting the clearest break from the
old regime. Some Islamic parties also have a network
of mosques and Islamic charities that can be called
upon to aid in the election of Islamic candidates and
help to fill a vacuum created by the collapse of other
institutions.
13. The United States must seek to support economic stability in the Arab Spring countries so long
as they remain friendly and democratic, while reminding Arab leaders of the economic problems associated with failed efforts at national unity in their
countries. In Iraq, the difficulties of the Sunni Arabs
led to an insurgency that routinely attacked Iraq’s
economic infrastructure, including the oil industry.
Building democratic, accountable, and transparent
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governments will not be easy for any of the Arab
Spring governments. Libya will be harder than Egypt
or Tunisia, and all countries need to understand the
importance of avoiding a downward spiral.
14. The U.S. Army will have to be aware that it
may be asked to play a limited role in rebuilding the
Libyan military. The United States will also have to
deal with the Libyan government on a variety of issues, such as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons accountability, and has a stake in the new government’s
success. This situation suggests that various forms of
military expertise and training may be provided to a
responsible Libyan government at some future point.
Such efforts will undoubtedly complement efforts by
other countries to help Libya, including its major trading partners in Europe and the Arab League. It may
also be possible, although not likely, that Libya may
have the building blocks of an insurgency. Pro-regime
holdouts conducted impressive defense of Sirte and
Bani Walid for some time after the rest of the country
was liberated.
15. The United States might wish to offer advanced military training and education to Libyan
officers that includes Western concepts of civil-military relations. Such training is already provided to
officers of other Arab Spring militaries. Additionally,
army officers who defected from the Libyan army and
fought for the rebels have a clear expectation that they
will have a role in the future of Libyan national security. These concerns need to be channeled in ways that
allow democratic processes and institution building
to move forward. If the Syrian government is overthrown, the United States may wish to consider ways
to reach out to help professionalize the military and
keep it out of politics. U.S.-Syrian relations may nev-
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ertheless be complicated by issues involving Israel
and the Palestinians in ways that will not occur with
Libya.
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